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Abstract
In September 1969, the United States and the Congress of Micronesia’s Joint Committee on
Future Status began their negotiations. This article will examine the negotiations which com-
menced in December 1972 and will concentrate on the three areas which were central points of
discussion: the political relationships between the United States and the Northern Marianas; issues
of economic development and assistance; and problems of land policy.
THE MARIANAS COVENANT NEGOTIATIONS
Arnold H. Leibowitz*
INTRODUCTION
During World War II United States strategists viewed the Is-
lands of Micronesia' as essential to peace in the Pacific and Ameri-
can security. 2 Balancing the various international pressures against
outright territorial acquisitions with the fear of Soviet territorial
ambitions elsewhere, the United States sought to administer these
Pacific Islands as a strategic trust territory, a unique relationship,
under the United Nations. 3 Mounting pressure by the United Na-
* A.B. 1951, Columbia College; LL.B. 1954 Yale University. Mr. Leibowitz was
General Counsel of the Status Commission on Puerto Rico (1964-66), counsel to the
Guam and Virgin Islands Constitutional Conventions, and counsel to the Northern
Marianas Office of Transition Studies. Currently he is an attorney in Washington,
D.C. and special legal counsel to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy.
1. Micronesia consists of three island chains in the western Pacific, just
above the equator: the Carolines, the Marshalls and the Marianas. The terri-
tory has more than 2,000 islands, fewer than 100 of which are inhabited.
They are scattered across an ocean area roughly the size of the continental
United States; yet the total land area (roughly 700 square miles) is only
about half the size of Rhode Island. The total population is less than
120,000.
D. MCHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 6 (1975).
2. For an explication of the strategic importance of the Mariana Islands in par-
ticular, see Comment, The Marianas, The United States, and the United Nations:
The Uncertain Status of the New American Commonwealth, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
382, 382 n.5 (1976).
3. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, Ap-
proved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947, entered into force July 18, 1947, 61
Stat. 397, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter cited as Trusteeship Agree-
ment]. The United Nations established ten other trust territories none of which was
a strategic trust. This strategic trust territory status, as distinguished from the more
customary trust relationship, allowed the United States to establish military bases,
station troops in the territory, control fully the administration of the Islands, and re-
port only to the Security Council, where the United States retained veto power, in-
stead of to the General Assembly. Furthermore, the United States, as administering
authority, could prohibit U.N. supervision in any areas specified as "closed for secu-
rity reasons." Id. art. 13. In return, the United States agreed to promote the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of the territory, encourage agriculture, industry, and education,
and promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory towards self-
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tions on the United States to promote Micronesia's progressive de-
velopment toward self-government or independence, and the Is-
landers' petition to President Lyndon Johnson in 1966 requesting
the establishment of a joint status commission to study available
political alternatives, caused President Johnson to ask Congress in
August 1967 to select a Presidential Commission to consider the fu-
ture status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).4
When the United States Congress did not act on the President's
proposal, the Congress of Micronesia established its own status
commission. In September 1969, the United States and the Con-
gress of Micronesia's Joint Committee on Future Status began their
negotiations.
Initially these status talks proceeded slowly, foundering over
issues such as the United States military presence and land acquisi-
tion policies. Dissension among the Micronesians was a further im-
pediment. When some TIPI representatives in the fall of 1971
strongly suggested independence as an option to be considered,
representatives of the Marianas District broke with their fellow Mi-
cronesians and expressed their desire for a close and permanent
political association with the United States. In April 1972, the
Marianas representatives officially requested separate status negoti-
ations. The following December, Ambassador F. Haydn Williams
recognized the Marianas Future Political Status Commission
(MPSC) and initiated separate talks with it. Thus the United States
embarked on a set of parallel negotiations: one with the representa-
tives of the Marianas moving towards a closer "commonwealth" re-
lationship and the second with the remaining districts of Micro-
nesia moving towards some sort of loose "associated state" status. 5
government or independence as may be appropriate to the freely expressed wishes
of the people. Id. art. 6.
4. "The terms 'Micronesia' and 'Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands' [TTPI]
are used interchangeably. Technically Guam and the Gilbert Islands are part of
Micronesia, but the United States had already acquired Guam, and the United King-
dor the Gilberts by the time the United Nations Mandate was established."
MCHENRY, supra note 1, at 6.
5. The Congress of Micronesia did not endorse these separate talks. See D.
MCHENRY, supra note 1, 132-33. In a Senate Joint Resolution it announced that
it is
the sole authority in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which is le-
gally authorized and empowered to conduct negotiations with regard to the
future political status of the Trust Territory, including all parts thereof, and
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When the United States and the Northern Marianas entered
into the "Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of
America" on February 15, 1975, it was the first United States ac-
quisition of a populated territory in almost fifty years. 6 The Cove-
nant was approved by a plebiscite conducted throughout the
Northern Marianas on June 17, 1975, 7 and President Ford signed
...Congress has the sole responsibility to negotiate on behalf of and pro-
vide for the future political status of the entire Trust Territory....
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, S.J. Res. 38, 5th Cong. of Micronesia, 1st Sess.
(1973). The Congress later reiterated its opposition in a harshly worded resolution:
WHEREAS, in its actions in this report, the United States has amply demon-
strated the contempt in which it holds the recommendations of the United
Nations Trusteeship Council and its 1973 Visiting Mission; the primacy of
its own selfish interests over those of Micronesia which it has sworn to
uphold and protect; and the complete and utter disregard which it has for
the wishes of the people of Micronesia, as expressed through their lawful
representatives in Congress assembled; now therefore,
BE IT RESOLVED by the Senate, Fifth Congress of Micronesia, First Spe-
cial Session, 1974, the House of Representatives concurring, that it is the
sense of the Congress of Micronesia that the separate administration of any
part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, without the opportunity
having been given to the inhabitants thereof to vote in the plebiscite and
referendum as to the future political status and form of government of
Micronesia, constitutes a violation of the obligations of the Administering
Authority under the Charter of the United Nations and under the Trustee-
ship Agreement, and a breach of its solemn obligations to the people of all
of Micronesia; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Congress hereby states in the
strongest possible terms, its unequivocal and total opposition to and con-
demnation of such separation prior to the holding, throughout all parts of the
Trust Territory, of a plebiscite on the future political status of Micronesia
and of a referendum as to the form of its future Government; ....
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, S.J. Res. 131, 5th Cong. of Micronesia, 1st
Spec. Sess. (1974).
The United Nations has consistently opposed division of colonial entities along
regional, tribal, or ethnic lines. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66
para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). For a discussion of U.N. efforts at discouraging se-
cessionist movements in trust territories, see Clark, Self Determination and Free As-
sociation: Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust? 21 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 79-80 nn.422-23 (1980). The U.N. specifically warned of the dangers of
fragmentation when the headquarters of the Trust Territory had been moved to
Saipan.
6. In 1925 the United States annexed Swan's Island to American Samoa. The
Newest Frontier, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1975, at 23.
7. "Thus, of a total of 5,000 actual votes cast, 3,945, or 78.8 percent were cast in
favour of the commonwealth as set forth in the Covenant, and 1,060 or 21.2 per cent,
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it into law on March 24, 1976.8
The Covenant was a unique method of expanding the Union.
Previous acquisitions were by purchase or by treaty. Regardless of
the method of acquisition the federal power to unilaterally
restructure the local government and its political and economic re-
lationship with the United States was accepted. The term "Cove-
nant" was used to remove the Marianas agreement from these pre-
cedents, and to require the federal government, not only morally
but also legally to carry out the terms of the agreement. Its use in
American law is unprecedented but its intention was to convey the
solemn and binding character of the agreement.
This article will examine the negotiations which commenced in
December 1972 and will concentrate on the three areas which
were central points of discussion: the political relationships be-
tween the United States and the Northern Marianas; issues of eco-
nomic development and assistance; and problems of land policy.9
were cast against, a margin of nearly 4 to 1 in favour of the Covenant." Report of the
United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mariana Islands
District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975 43 U.N. TCOR, Supp. (No.
2) 34, U.N. Doc. T/1770 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Plebiscite Report]. See also letter
from Erwin Canham, Plebiscite Commissioner, to President Ford (June 19, 1975), re-
printed in S. REP. No. 433, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 413-14 (1975).
8. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, (1976) Pub. L. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263
[hereinafter cited as Marianas Covenant]. This concluded the long series of negotia-
tions between U.S. government representatives acting generally through the Office
of Micronesian Status Negotiations and the Island officials operating as the Marianas
Political Status Commission (MPSC). The MPSC was created for the purpose of tak-
ing "appropriate and necessary steps" toward the resolution of the question of the
future political status of the Northern Mariana Islands District. Act Creating the
Marianas Political Status Comm.: Setting fourth [sic] its Powers and Duties: And for
Other Purposes, Dist. Law No. 3-124, 3d Mariana Islands Dist. Legislature, 1st Spec.
Sess. (1972) reprinted in Marianas Political Status Comm'n, The Future Political Sta-
tus of the Mariana Islands District, Report on 1st Sess. of Status Negotiations, 4th
Mariana Islands Dist. Legislature, 1st Sess., iii-vi (1973) [hereinafter cited as MPSC
First Session Report].
9. This analysis of the Marianas Covenant is based on the five basic drafts de-
veloped during status negotiations which took place from December 1972 to Febru-
ary 1975. These documents are: (1) Draft Proposed by the U.S. Delegation (Dec.
1973) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft]; (2) Draft Proposed by the Marianas Political
Status Commission (May 1974) [hereinafter cited as MPSC Draft]; (3) Working Draft
of the Joint Drafting Committee (composed of representatives from both sides) (Nov.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Joint Draft]; (4) Draft Agreed to by the Parties, but with
reservations by the U.S. Delegation, ad referendum (Dec. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Reserved Draft]; and (5) The Marianas Covenant, supra note 8.
1981] MARIANAS COVENANT
I. THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
A. Commonwealth Status
The United States Constitution speaks only of "states" and
"territories. "10 The presently held territories" are neither states
nor are they likely to become states soon. In the past, the United
States imperial attitudes hindered the attainment of statehood for
these areas. But now, in many cases, it is the territory's own desire
to maintain its cultural identity which causes the delay.
If an organized area is a state, there are two constitutional lim-
itations on federal authority: equality of treatment 12 and residual
state powers.'" A territory, however, does not benefit from such
limitations. The Territorial Clause 14 of the Constitution was inter-
preted in the nineteenth century to permit the exercise of broad
congressional and executive discretion with respect to territories.15
The extent of this authority was premised upon certain recognized
evolutionary stages, 16 originally set forth in the Northwest Ordi-
10. See, Leibowitz, United States Federalism: The States and the Territories,
28 AM. U.L.R. 449 (1979).
11. United States territories include Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and formerly the Canal Zone. Branch, The Constitution of the
Northern Mariana Islands: Does a Different Cultural Setting Justify Different Con-
stitutional Standards?, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 39 n.22 (1980).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6; art. IV, § 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 & 2; art. IV, §
4.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively or to the people."
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, states: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State."
15. See Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889); see
generally City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453 (1879); Nat'l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101
U.S. 129 (1879); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648 (1873); Snow v.
United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 317 (1873); Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160
(1864); Miners Bank of Dubuque v. Iowa, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 1 (1851); Benner v. Por-
ter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850).
16. During the first stage, a congressionally designated governor and other fed-
erally appointed judicial and executive officials would govern the territory. The terri-
tory would then be permitted to elect a legislative body and draft a permanent con-
stitution. The final stage was the establishment of popular self-government. See
Leibowitz, United States Federalism: The States and the Territories, 28 AM. U.L.R.
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nance, 17 leading to statehood.
Article I of the Marianas Covenant provides that upon termi-
nation of the Trusteeship Agreement under which the United
States governs the TTPI, the Northern Mariana Islands become "a
self-governing commonwealth . . . in political union with and un-
der the sovereignty of the United States of America." 18 Almost
from the outset the Marianas agreed that it desired a common-
wealth affiliation with the United States, though it could not decide
on the form and nature of that relationship. 19
Commonwealth status would permit a maximum degree of
self-government within the limitations set by the United States
Constitution, federal legislation implementing the commonwealth
relationship, and federal laws generally applicable to all United
States territories. There would be, however, no limitation on po-
tential federal power. 20 The Northern Marianas desired restraint
449, 451 (1979). The exercise of executive and congressional authority over the terri-
tories was limited both by time, the territory would shortly move on to statehood, as
well as by the institutional limitations required to permit the evolution toward state-
hood. Where such an evolution is not envisioned or sought, however, the territorial
clause authority can appear very threatening.
17. Northwest Ordinance of 178.7, full text cited in Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8,
1 Stat. 50.
18. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 101; Marianas Political Status Comm'n
Section by Section Analysis of the Covenant to Establish A Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands 6 (February 15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Covenant Anal-
ysis].
19. MPSC First Session Report, supra note 8, at 18. Both parties agreed that
the term commonwealth implied something more than the term territory. To the U.S.
Delegation, however, the major distinction was that a commonwealth was afforded a
greater degree of self-government. Id. at 27.
20. Subsequent to the negotiations, the Supreme Court stated in Examining
Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), that while commonwealth status has
legal consequences different from territorial status, the nature of that difference is
unclear. 426 U.S. at 594 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 671 (1974) which held that Puerto Rico was to be treated as a state for pur-
poses of the Three Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)).
In Examining Board, local residents challenged a Puerto Rican statute restricting
civil engineer licenses to U.S. citizens. The Court reviewed at considerable length
the history of federal legislation with respect to Puerto Rico and then stated: "We
readily concede that Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that
has no parallel in our history. .. " 426 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added). See also
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). The
effect of this unparalleled relationship remained unclear since, in the decision itself,
the fact that Puerto Rico had commonwealth status was of no consequence at all.
Rather, the Court followed traditional standards to declare unconstitutional the local
government statute and to grant jurisdiction to the federal district court in Puerto
Rico.
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on federal power. The negotiations ultimately turned on the possi-
bility of limiting federal authority operating under the Territorial
Clause by requiring the Marianas' consent before it could be ex-
ercised. The Marianas officials, looking to the example of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, argued in favor of a compact requir-
ing mutual consent. 21 The United States, however, likened the
Marianas to a territory, permitting the exercise of federal authority,
and believed that the term commonwealth was important in name
and form only. In addition, the United States Delegation urged
uniform treatment, whenever possible with Guam. Their reasons
for this position were Guam's territorial status and Congress' hope
that these Chamarro peopled islands would eventually be united.
Subsequent to the first session of status negotiations in December
1972, the MPSC analyzed the available political status alternatives
and for the foregoing reasons concluded that the alternative which
would best serve the interests of the people of the Mariana Islands
was a commonwealth arrangement. 22
B. The Territorial Clause and Mutual Consent
In May 1973, during the second session of negotiations, the
MPSC stated that the source of the political status between the
United States and the Marianas would be three basic documents: a
compact requiring mutual consent, a Marianas Federal Regulations
Act and a commonwealth constitution. 23 As the negotiations pro-
gressed, however, the emphasis shifted to the compact and the
constitution to the complete exclusion of the Marianas Federal
Relations Act. The United States' view of a self-governing com-
monwealth with limited consequences required the reaffirmation of
the territorial clause. 24 In response to the United States Delega-
21. See, Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 56 GEo. L.J. 219, 220-34 (1967).
22. Its position was that the basic document defining such arrangement should
treat the following points: the source of political status; the amendment or termina-
tion of the political status; the right of local self-government; the applicability of U.S.
Constitution and laws; the authority over defense and foreign affairs; and, represen-
tation in Washington. See Marianas Political Status Commission Position Paper Re-
garding the Future Political Status of the Mariana Islands (May 10, 1973), reprinted
in Marianas Political Status Comm'n, Report on 2d Sess. of Status Negotiations, 4th
Mariana Islands Distri'ct Legislature, 8-9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MPSC Report].
23. Id. at 9.
24. Summary of United States Informal Remarks on Marianas Political Status
Commission Paper on Limitations on Federal Authority (1973) [hereinafter cited as
U.S. Informal Remarks Summary].
19811
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tion's suggestion that the political relationship would be essentially
territorial," 25 the MPSC reemphasized its expectation of full self-
government for the Marianas and questioned whether the principle
of maximum self-government could be reconciled with the plenary
powers of Congress under the Territorial Clause. 26 Thus it looked
to a study of possible exemptions from legislation enacted pursuant
to the Territorial Clause. 27 The compromise, which is reflected in
the Covenant, is the acceptance of the Territorial Clause with the
establishment of mutual consent as the key principle of the Cove-
nant. 2
8
The Covenant establishes an area which can not be changed
without mutual consent. This area outside the reach of the Territo-
rial clause was delineated without granting the Covenant the broad
compact status which the MPSC wanted. Also it did not provide
clear restrictions on Congress' Territorial clause powers. This com-
promise, put forth by the United States Delegation, was reluc-
tantly accepted by the MPSC.
During the work seminar conducted in May 1973, and in the
session following in December 1973, the United States Delegation
argued that as a historical and practical matter, Congress had not
interfered in the internal affairs of United States territories and
that the "mutual consent" provision was a politically feasible device
to insure against any feared interference. 29 The MPSC countered
that Congress' power under the Territorial Clause was not necessa-
25. See U.S. Statement on Political Status for May 16 (1973) Working Session,
reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 12.
26. See Position of Marianas Political Status Commission on Subject of Self-
Government, reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 28.
27. The Commission is not in any way seeking exemption from Federal
legislation applicable to the states or territories which is enacted by Con-
gress under Constitutional powers other than Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2.
We are interested only in exploring-together with the U.S. Delegation-
whether some specific limitations on the plenary powers of Congress under
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, can be developed which would make clearer
that the Commonwealth of the Marianas has maximum (or paramount) con-
trol over its internal affairs. Many approaches are possible, some involving
express exemptions to Article IV, and others involving legislative history
alone....
Id. (emphasis in original). At this point, both sides were like trailblazers, negotiating
the extent of the Territorial Clause powers and the possibility of restricting such
power via a compact.
28. See Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 105. See generally! Covenant Analy-
sis, supra note 18, at 13-19.
29. See U.S. Informal Remarks Summary, supra note 24.
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rily plenary and that it could be limited within the text of the Cov-
enant as long as no other specific constitutional provision was
brought into conflict. 30 In addition, the MPSC argued that unquali-
fied application of the Territorial Clause might well undercut the
"1mutual consent" principle. 3 1 The United States Delegation re-
sponded by stating that Congress would not retain authority incon-
sistent with the "mutual consent" principle since that principle
would be a clear limitation of congressional authority under the
Territorial Clause. The first Position Paper of the MPSC had pro-
posed a mutual consent provision; however, the provision was put
forth primarily with regard to the issue of amendment or termina-
tion of the political status itself. The United States Delegation ini-
tially resisted the idea of the "mutual consent" principle, particu-
larly since the principle had been linked by the MPSC to a notion
of "compact" and to the sensitive issues of termination and separa-
tion. 32 In the course of the working sessions, however, the Delega-
tion agreed to expand the coverage of the mutual consent principle
to other areas, stressing "the necessity of exercising extreme care
in the drafting process to insure that the mutual consent provision
will apply only to major structural changes in the commonwealth
arrangement.- 33 Not surprisingly, the United States sought to limit
the applicability of the "mutual consent" formula while the
Marianas sought to extend it. Thus, the United States Draft pro-
vided for the inclusion of a list of "fundamental provisions," which
would be subject to the mutual consent principle, but left the list
blank pending future negotiations. 34 The MPSC Draft, for its part,
delineated which provisions of the agreement establishing the com-
monwealth would be subject to the "mutual consent" principle. 35
30. Position of Marianas Political Status Commission on Subject of Self-
Government (1973), reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 28-29. The United
States did not dispute this proposition on its merits, but expressed uncertainty con-
cerning the fate of such limitations if subjected to judicial review. "The United
States has no argument with this proposition as a legal matter. Of course, it cannot
be said with certainty what courts will say about the restrictions which may be
imposed in this agreement on Congress' authority under IV-3-2." U.S. Informal Re-
marks Summary, supra note 24, at 3.
31. Position Paper of Marianas Political Status Commission on Subject of Self
Government, reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 28-29.
32. See U.S. Statement on Political Status for May 16 (1973) Working Session,
reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 18-19.
33. Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
34. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 102.
35. This list included all provisions of the Agreement, with the exception of the
Preamble and Article IV, which dealt with the interim applicability of federal laws.
1981]
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After the Joint Draft was completed, differences over the limi-
tations placed on federal authority under the Territorial Clause re-
mained. The MPSC favored a compelling national interest test,
while the United States Delegation took the position that the terri-
torial clause powers should be limited only where the Covenant re-
quired mutual consent. The Joint Drafting Committee ultimately
recommended that the provisions of Articles I, II, and III, regard-
ing United States citizenship and nationality, and of section 501,
regarding the applicability of the United States Constitution, be
subject to the mutual consent provision. The MPSC, however,
continued to insist that additional provisions be subject to mutual
consent. 36
Differences also remained on the manner in which the mutual
consent provisions would be implemented. The Joint Draft pro-
vided that upon approval of the agreement, such provisions would
take effect immediately. 37 A statement was also included in the
negotiating history stating that consent on behalf of the Marianas
could not be given prior to termination of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment except by the people of the Marianas or their duly elected
representatives in accordance with their laws and constitution. This
was designed to allay the MPSC's fears that the United States
Commissioners in the Marianas would unilaterally consent to a
change of fundamental provisions in the Covenant. In short, both
sides agreed that, in defining the commonwealth relationship, they
would be on the frontier of American constitutional law. The politi-
cal relationship between the United States and the Marianas is de-
fined and governed by the Covenant. In addition to applicable pro-
visions of the United States Constitution, treaties, and laws, the
Covenant is the supreme law of the commonwealth. 38 The legisla-
36. Specifically the MPSC insisted on the inclusion of:
(1) § 503, prohibiting application of certain federal laws, including immigration and
naturalization laws and coastwise shipping laws, until Congress acts to make
them applicable after the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement;
(2) § 805, permitting the restriction of the alienation of long-term interests in real
property to persons of the Northern Mariana Islands descent;
(3) § 806, imposing procedural requirements upon the exercise of the eminent do-
main authority of the United States; and,
(4) § 702, providing for multi-year direct financial assistance for a seven-year period.
37. See Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 100(4)(a).
38. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 102; Covenant Analysis, supra note 18,
at 6-9.
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tive authority of the United States, as set forth in the Covenant, is
limited.39
Thus the Covenant contains two limitations on federal legisla-
tive authority: a procedural requisite that federal legislation specifi-
cally mention the Northern Marianas if it is to be applicable to the
commonwealth and the substantive requisite that the prior consent
of the commonwealth be acquired before the implementation of
federal law. The latter is a unique, specific limitation on Congress'
territorial clause authority.4 0
C. Local Self-Government
1. Approval of the Local Constitution
The Covenant's limitation on the sovereign authority of the
United States is evident in the provisions of Section 103 and Arti-
cle 11.41 The Covenant follows standard enabling act procedure: ap-
proval by the people of the Northern Marianas in a referendum fol-
lowed by submission to the Congress and the President for
approval. 42 The United States Delegation agreed to this procedure
for the passage of the Marianas Constitution as well, but wanted fi-
nal approval of the constitution to be by the President alone. There
is some precedent for this in state enabling act procedures, al-
39. The United States may enact legislation in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes which will be applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands,
but if such legislation cannot also be made applicable to the several States
the Northern Mariana Islands must be specifically named therein for it to
become effective in the Northern Mariana Islands. In order to respect the
right of self-government guaranteed by this Covenant, the United States
agrees to limit the exercise of that authority so that the fundamental provi-
sions of this Covenant, namely, Articles I, II and III and Sections 501 and
805, may be modified only with the consent of the Government of the
United States and the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 105 (emphasis added).
40. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 105; Covenant Analysis, supra note 18,
at 13-19.
41. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 103 states: "The people of the Northern
Mariana Islands will have the right of local self government and will govern them-
selves with respect to internal affairs in accordance with a Constitution of their own
adoption." See Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 10-12.
42. These provisions provide for the formulation, approval and possible amend-
ment of the local constitution developed by the people of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 201; Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
20-21.
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though it is unusual. The Marianas delegation requested that ap-
proval of the Constitution be in the same fashion as the Covenant;
namely, by the Congress as well. This would insure that the consti-
tution would be equally binding on all branches of government.
The MPSC finally submitted to the United States Delegation's
position. Presidential review, however, was limited to the question
of the consistency of the constitution with the status agreement.
Although the issue appeared to be settled, the United States Dele-
gation modified its position, stating its preference for the United
States government to have discretion to decide whether the Presi-
dent or Congress approves the constitution. Congressional interest
in the terms of the constitution may well have caused this reversal.
In line with its position, the United States Delegation also insisted
that the wording be sufficiently flexible to permit either Congress
or the President to approve the status agreement on behalf of the
United States.
In response, the MPSC proposed language indicating that the
United States would be deemed to have approved the constitution
if no action were taken within a given period of time. After its ini-
tial hesitation, the United States Delegation accepted this sugges-
tion, and the Covenant eventually included a six month time pe-
riod. 43
In approving the constitutions of Puerto Rico and other states,
Congress had required the insertion of provisions based on its own
preferences. Thus, the Covenant includes the express criteria to be
used by Congress and clearly requires expeditious action. 44 In
deciding whether to approve the Covenant, Congress is to deter-
mine the Constitution's "consistency with this Covenant and those
provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United
States to be applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands.' '45 Unless
it is earlier approved or disapproved, the constitution will be
deemed to have been approved six months after its submission to
the President of the United States.46
43. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 202; Covenant Analysis, supra note 18,
at 21-22.
44. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 202; Covenant Analysis, supra note 18,
at 21-22. Originally the MPSC suggested sixty days. See Joint Draft, supra note 9, §
202.
45, Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 202.
46. See Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 21-23. For a discussion of the
Constitution, see Branch, The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Does a
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There was a considerable discussion of the procedure for
amending the constitution. Under the terms agreed to, amend-
ments do not have to be specifically approved by the United
States, provided that they are consistent with the Covenant and
applicable provisions of the United States Constitution, treaties and
federal laws. To insure this consistency the Covenant provides that
federal courts will review the amendments. 47
2. Local Legislative and Executive Authority
The requirements of the Covenant which delineate the con-
tent of the constitution are standard. It must "provide for a repub-
lican form of government with separate executive, legislative and
judicial branches, and . . . a bill of rights." 48 But, section 203(c) is
a singularly exceptional provision for it insures the chartered mu-
nicipalities of Rota and Tinian a degree of legislative representation
somewhat beyond what would be their proportionate share. In
doing so, it also attempts to avoid constitutional objection. 49
The United States Draft spoke in terms of local legislative
power over "all subjects of local application." 50 The MPSC argued
that the language of section 304 of this draft was identical to that
contained in the Guam Organic Act of 1950, 51 and therefore there
was the danger that judicial construction of these provisions would
be applied to the Covenant provision. Thus the MPSC Draft pro-
vided that the authority of the fiture Commonwealth would extend
to "all matters of local concern;" such authority was to be exercised
in a matter consistent with the Commonwealth Agreement, the
Different Cultural Setting Justify Different Constitutional Standards?, 9 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 35 (1980); Willens & Siemer, The Constitution of the Northern
Mariana Islands: Constitutional Principles and Innovations in a Pacific Setting, 65
GEO. L.J. 1373 (1977).
47. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 202; see (Covenant Analysis, supra note
18, at 21-23.
48. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 203(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 23-24.
49. Section 2 03 (c) states: "The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands
will provide for equal representation for each of the chartered municipalities of the
Northern Mariana Islands in one house of a bicameral legislature .. " This was pro-
mulgated in response to the criticism that the Saipanese had benefitted financially at
the expense of these other islands where the military operations were actually to
take place. See Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 24-25.
50. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 304.
51. Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 11, 64 Stat. 387 (as amended codified at 48
U.S.C. § 1423a (1976)).
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United States Constitution and applicable federal laws. 52 The
United States Delegation rejected the use of the phrase "all mat-
ters of local concern," which had not been used previously in
United States territorial experience, and proposed the phrase "to
all matters of local application," the phrase used in the Virgin Is-
lands Organic Act of 1936. 53
The MPSC Draft omitted a provision of the United States
Draft that would have authorized the Governor of the Common-
wealth to request United States military assistance from the Presi-
dent in the case of an emergency. 54 The MPSC argued that it
would be more appropriate if this power were granted by the con-
stitution of the future commonwealth.5 5 This position is reflected in
the Covenant.
52. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 2 0 5(a).
53. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 699, § 1, 49 Stat. 1807 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§
1405-1406 (1976)). But this phrase had been somewhat narrowly construed by the
Supreme Court in Granville-Sinith v. Granville-Srnith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). In this case
the Court invalidated a Virgin Islands' statute which was designed to attract the di-
vorce business to the Islands and suggested that territorial legislative powers may be
limited to "subjects having relevant ties within the territory, to laws growing out of
the needs of the Islands and governing relations with them." 349 U.S. at 10.
In response to a petition by the Virgin Islands, Congress amended the Revised
Organic Act in 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-851, § 2, 72 Stat. 1094 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §
1574(a) (1976)), to substitute "rightful subjects of legislation," the term used in the
Organic Acts of earlier territories, including Alaska, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, §
9, 37 Stat. 514, and Hawaii, Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 55, 31 Stat. 150, for "sub-
jects of local application." This appeared to be of some importance when federal
courts subsequently sustained the Virgin Islands' tax incentive program. See Post
Constr. Co. v. Yirgin Islands, 359 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1966). In this case the Third Cir-
cuit also declared that the legislature of the Virgin Islands possesses full legislative
power in this area, in common with the legislatures of the several states. 359 F.2d at
667-68.
Because "all rightful subjects of legislation," appeared to be the broadest formu-
lation of the extent of a territory's legislative power, the MPSC continued to insist
upon it and that phrase was used in the final version of § 2 03(c) of the Covenant. See
Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 23.
54. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 303 provided: "Whenever it becomes necessary
in case of disaster, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,
or to prevent or .suppress lawless violence, the Governor of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands may request Forces of the United States."
55. The MPSC analogized to the situation in Puerto Rico where similar power
was not granted by statute but rather was granted in the constitution. See P.R.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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D. Foreign Affairs and Defense
The Covenant accords the federal government broad powers
over the conducting of foreign affairs and defense. 56 This pro-
vision was never questioned; it appears in the same form in all of
the early drafts. 57 The MPSC proposed that the United States seek
"the fullest possible consultation" with the Marianas regarding for-
eign matters affecting the Marianas. 58 Where treaties which relate
significantly to the Marianas are contemplated, the MPSC pro-
posed that the consent of the Marianas be secured before the
United States negotiates such treaties.
It was agreed during the third session of negotiations in De-
cember 1973 that the United States would have full responsibility
and authority in matters of defense and foreign affairs. The United
States in turn agreed to consider the advice of the future common-
wealth as to pertinent international questions. There would be,
however, no consultation as of right, and the commonwealth would
not be able to exercise any veto power over pending treaty negoti-
ations in which the United States Government was involved. 59 The
United States Delegation also agreed to support the future com-
monwealth's membership in appropriate international and regional
bodies concerned with economic, cultural and other matters of in-
terest to the commonwealth. This represented somewhat of a break-
through since the United States had generally opposed the admis-
sion of the territories into international bodies. Furthermore, the
future commonwealth would be permitted to establish offices
abroad for the promotion of local tourism and other economic in-
terests.
56. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 104. See Marianas Political Status Com-
mission Position Paper Regarding the Future Political Status of the Mariana Islands
(May 10, 1973) reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 13. See Covenant Analy-
sis, supra note 18, at 12.
57. See, U.S. Draft, supra note 9, art. V.
58. MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 14.
59. See U.S. Statement on Political Status for May 16 (1973) Working Session,
reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 21. On the issue of direct participation
by the future commonwealth in international and regional organizations, the Delega-
tion gave a sympathetic but rather unenthusiastic response. See id.
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E. Applicability of Federal Law
1. The General Presumptions
The Covenant embodies general presumptions that certain
federal laws either do or do not apply. It further provides that
Congress retains the power to unilaterally alter these presump-
tions. Until such congressional action is taken, however, the pre-
sumptions remain in effect.60
The Joint Draft settled most problems of the applicability of
federal law. Section 501, for example, provided that certain provi-
sions of the United States Constitution, including all provisions
identified by the MPSC Draft, would apply to the Marianas as it
60. The following laws are presumed to apply to the Northern Mariana Islands
under the Covenant: 1) Laws providing for federal services and financial assistance
programs, and the banking laws, as they apply to Guam; 2) Section 228 of Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as they apply to the states; 3) The Public
Health Services Act, as it applies to the Virgin Islands; 4) Those laws applicable to
Guam, and of general application to the states, which are not covered in (1)-(3) su-
pra, as they apply to the states; and, 5) Those laws applicable to the TTPI, not
including subsequent amendments unless specifically made applicable, which are
not covered in (1)-(4), supra, as they apply to the TTPI, until termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement, after which time they will be inapplicable. Marianas Cove-
nant, supra note 8, § 502(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 48-55.
In addition United States laws governing coastal shipments and conditions of
employment, including wages and hours, will apply to the activities of the United
States government and those of its contractors in the Marianas. Marianas Covenant,
supra note 8, § 502(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 55. Also applicable
are those provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act which deal with the ad-
mission of "immediate relatives" of individuals in the Marianas who become United
States citizens by way of the collective naturalization provision of art. III of the Cov-
enant. Marianas Covenant, su pra note 8, § 506; see Covenant Analysis, supra note
18, at 62-63. Finally, the United States income tax laws apply to the Marianas as
those laws apply to Guam, namely as a local territorial tax. Marianas Covenant, supra
note 7, § 601(a); see Covenant Analysis, su pra note 18 at 67-71.
The following laws will not be applicable to the Marianas unless extended by
Congress after termination of the Trusteeship: (1) United States immigration and nat-
uralization laws, except as otherwise provided in § 502; (2) Coastwise laws, except as
otherwise provided in § 502(b); (3) Laws prohibiting landing of fish or unfinished
fish products by foreign vessels, except as otherwise provided in § 502(b); (4) United
States minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 718, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062, as amended April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 2-4.
5(b), 7(b)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 56, 62. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 503; see Cove-
nant Analysis, supra note 18, at 55-58.
Furthermore, the Marianas will not be included within the United States cus-
toms territory. Local authority over customs, however, must be exercised in a manner
consistent with the United States international obligations. Marianas Covenant, su-
pra note 8, § 603(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 73.
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would to a state."' This section also provided that other provisions
of the United States Constitution which were inapplicable to the
Marianas as a commonwealth, would not be applicable unless the
parties mutually agreed.
Since section 501 of the Joint Draft provided that the Marianas
was to be treated as a state for the purposes of the application
of certain provisions of the United States Constitution, includ-
ing the Bill of Rights, the question arose whether the Marianas
should be bound by the requirements of a federal grand jury in-
dictment under the Sixth Amendment and of a trial by jury under
the Seventh Amendment. The United States Delegation was will-
ing to treat the Marianas as a state, or to add language which
would cause them to be bound by these provisions of the constitu-
tion which have not been extended to unincorporated territories.
The MPSC, ultimately decided that the Marianas should be treated
as a state. Accordingly section 501 of the Marianas Covenant pro-
vides, "neither trial by jury nor indictment by grand jury shall be
required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local
law, except where required by local law." 62
2. The Commission on Federal Laws
To offset the restrictiveness of the general formula presump-
tions, section 402 of the MPSC Draft, like section 802 of the
United States Draft, provided that the President would appoint a
commission to survey the federal statutory laws and make recom-
mendations to the Congress concerning which laws should be ap-
plicable to the Marianas. At least four of the seven members of the
commission were to be Marianas residents who qualified under col-
lective naturalization provisions63 of the agreement. 64
61. The applicable provisions mentioned in the Joint Draft are: U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 8; art. I, § 10, cl. 1; art. I, § 10, cl. 3; art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; amend. XIV, § 1,
cl. 1. Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 501. With the exception of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 3, the Covenant includes the applicable provisions supra along with the follow-
ing: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2 & 3; art. IV, § 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; amends. I-IX,
XIII, XIV, XIX, and XXVI. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 501; see Covenant
Analysis, supra note 18, at 3944.
62. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 501; see Covenant Analysis, supra note
18, at 45-46. Section 501 also insures that future amendments to the United States
Constitution can be reviewed before they become applicable to the Marianas unless
they are so fundamental that they apply of their own force. Id.
63. See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
64. A commission on the application of federal laws to a territory is standard
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The MPSC argued that this delegation of legislative power to a
commission would be upheld by United States courts as long as
Congress provided a standard which was sufficiently precise to en-
able the courts to ascertain whether the congressional intent was be-
ing executed.6 5 Thus section 402(a) of the 1974 Draft required that
the commission consider the effect of each federal law on the local
conditions in the Marianas, the federal policies embodied therein
and the consistency of the law with the provisions and purposes of
the Covenant.
The Joint Draft provided for a Commission on Federal laws
which was to issue interim reports and a final report within one
year after termination of the trusteeship. This was unlike the
MPSC Draft which had provided for a final report within two years
after the commission came into existence. The change was made to
procedure. Puerto Rico (1947), Virgin Islands (1950), and Guam (1950) had
congressionally established commissions on this question. The record of these com-
missions, however, is bleak. Congress rarely acted on the detailed recommendations
contained in these reports. Section 402(b) of the 1974 Draft hoped to remedy this by
providing that unless the House or Senate enacted legislation which specifically dis-
approves all or part of the recommendations of the Marianas Commission within one
year after having received those recommendations, the recommendations would have
the force of law.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533 (1939), Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Also, in 1964 Congress delegated to the Secretary
of Agriculture the power to establish agricultural programs in Guam "as are deter-
mined by the Secretary [to] promote the welfare of that island," despite the fact that
Guam had originally been excluded by Congress from such programs. Act of Sept. 7,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-584, 78 Stat. 926 (expired 1969).
Other precedents not cited by the MPSC appear to support its argument. Dele-
gations of similar scope arose during the course of Federal administration of the
Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico and both were sustained by the courts. As early
as 1916, the authority to set tariffs was delegated to the Philippine Legislature, sub-
ject to the approval of the President. This was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Wright v. Ynchausti & Co., 272 U.S. 640 (1926). In Puerto Rico, following the hurri-
cane of September 1928, Puerto Rico's coffee crop suffered sizeable losses. In order
to assist the rehabilitation of Puerto Rico's coffee industry which was faced with low-
priced Brazilian imports, Congress, in June 1930, empowered the Legislature of
Puerto Rico to set a duty on coffee entering Puerto Rico, although no such duty was
to be imposed on imports into the States. This delegation of authority was chal-
lenged but upheld as a valid delegation both before and after the establishment of
the commonwealth. See Porto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 611
(C.C.P.A. 1935); Porto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 469 (C.C.P.A.
1934); Nestle Prods., Inc. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 792 (Cust. Ct. 1970). The
Supreme Court also sustained a delegation of authority to the Philippine Executive,
acting pursuant to the Philippine Legislature, concerning immigration. Tiaco v.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549 (1913).
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allow the commission to gain experience with the problems actually
created in the Marianas as a result of the application of federal
laws. Substantive differences remained concerning the question of
whether the commission's recommendations would automatically
become law unless specifically disapproved by Congress. The
United States Delegation argued that it was undesirable to allow
recommendations coming to Congress from bodies other than the
executive branch to become law simply by virtue of congressional
inaction, because in such situations the President has no opportu-
nity to veto the recommendations. The United States Delegation
also refused to finance the work of the commission. The MPSC
viewed such financing as a federal responsibility, for it believed
that the limited resources of the Marianas should not be drained.
Although the United States Delegation eventually agreed to federal
financing, the commission's report was not to become effective with-
out specific action by Congress.
F. Jurisdiction of Courts
The Marianas Covenant sets forth both the judicial authority of
United States courts in the commonwealth and the relationship be-
tween these courts and those established by the commonwealth. 66
The Covenant follows territorial precedents by giving the United
States district court special regional and appellate jurisdiction but it
also contains unique options specifically for the Marianas. A United
States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands is estab-
lished as part of the Ninth Circuit which includes Guam as well. 67
This court has "the jurisdiction of a district court of the United
States,"68 except that in federal question cases there is no mone-
tary requirement as to the amount in controversy. 69 The court will
also have original jurisdiction where the constitution or laws of the
commonwealth have not vested jurisdiction in a local court. 70 In
such cases the district court is to be considered a commonwealth
66. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, art. IV; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 32-39.
67. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 401; see Covenant Analysis, supra note
18, at 32-33.
68. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 402(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 34.
69. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 402(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 34.
70. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 402(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 34-35.
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court for the purposes of determining the requirements of indict-
ment by grand jury and trial by jury. 71 Furthermore, the common-
wealth may vest the district court with appellate jurisdiction. 72
As to the relationship between the United States courts and
the courts to be established by the commonwealth, specifically
with reference to appeals, certiorari, removal, issuance of writs of
habeas corpus and like matters, the Covenant provides that these
proceedings are to be governed by the same laws pertaining to the
federal and state courts. 73 Nevertheless, for the first fifteen years
after a commonwealth appellate court is established, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes the
Marianas and Guam, is to have appellate jurisdiction over "all final
decisions of the highest court of the Northern Mariana Islands ...
unless those cases are reviewable in the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to Subsection 402(c)."-74 The
MPSC believed this facilitated federal review, which would other-
wise depend solely on the United States Supreme Court, where
review was most unlikely.
Originally, the MPSC anticipated that, as in the case of Guam,
a district judge would be appointed to an initial eight year term.
They hoped this would be followed by the appointment of a life-
tenured judge as was done in Puerto Rico after the attainment of
commonwealth status. 75 But the agreement reached in the Joint
Draft, reflecting the terms of the United States Draft, limited ten-
ure to eight years. The representatives of the MPSC on the Joint
Drafting Committee accepted this significant change of position be-
cause their interests in securing a federal court in the Marianas, as
71. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 402(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 34-35.
72. The District Court will have such appellate jurisdiction as the Constitu-
tion or laws of the Northern Mariana Islands may provide. When it sits as an
appellate court, the District Court will consist of three judges, at least one of
whom will be a judge of a court of record of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 4 02(c).
73. Those portions of Title 28 of the United States Code which apply to Guam
or the United States District Court in Guam are to be applicable to the Marianas and
the District Court in the Marianas, except as otherwise provided in Article IV.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 403(b). See Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
38.
74. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 403(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 37.
75. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 501.
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well as the authority to grant that court jurisdiction over local
cases, were sufficiently served by the terms of the Joint Draft.
G. Citizenship, Nationality and Restrictions on Immigration
Article III of the Covenant sets forth the basic principles con-
cerning the collective naturalization that will be implemented si-
multaneously with the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. 76
The language used therein relating to collective naturalization is
comparable to that used with respect to other territories of the
United States. 77
76. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1003(c) provides that the date of the
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement will be the effective date for all the provi-
sions of Article III, except for § 304 guaranteeing the citizens of the Northern
Mariana Islands all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. See
generally Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 132-33. This section is effective on a
date to be determined by the President, which date will be not more than 180 days
after the approval of the Covenant and the Constitution. Marianas Covenant, supra
note 8, § 1003(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 132.
77. M.P.S.C. Position Paper on U.S. Citizenship and Nationality in the Com-
monwealth of the Mariana Islands (Dec. 6, 1973). The Covenant provides that the
following persons, together with their children under 18 years of age, became citi-
zens of the United States:
(1) all persons born in the Northern Mariana Islands who are citizens of the
TTPI on the day preceding the termination of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment, and who on that date are domiciled in the Northern Marianas, the
United States, of any territory or possession thereof;
(2) all persons who are citizens of the TTPI on the day preceding the termi-
nation, who have been domiciled continuously in the Northern Marianas
for at least five years immediately prior to that date, and who registered
to vote in elections for the Mariana Islands District Legislature or for
any municipal election in the Northern Mariana Islands prior to January
1, 1975, unless they are underage; and,
(3) all persons domiciled in the Northern Marianas on the day preceding
termination, who, although not citizens of the TTPI, on that date have
been domiciled continuously in the Northern Marianas beginning prior
to January 1, 1974.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 301; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
27-29. Any person who does become a citizen under the above provisions has the op-
tion under § 302 of making a declaration, under oath, before any federal or common-
wealth court, stating his intention to be a "national," rather than a citizen, of the
United States. Such a declaration must be made within six months after the termina-
tion of the Trusteeship Agreement, or within six months after reaching 18 years of
age, whichever is later. Only persons subject to the original collective naturalization
of § 301 will have this option. Thereafter, all persons born in the commonwealth on
or after termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, and who are subject to United States
jurisdiction will be United States citizens at birth. Marianas Covenant, supra note
8, § 303; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 30. For a discussion of the classes of
people excluded from this grant of citizenship, see Note, The Commonwealth of the
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The immigration and naturalization laws of the United States
will not apply to the commonwealth unless Congress specifically
acts to require their application. 78 The Marianas possess, at least
temporarily, extraordinary control over immigration. 79 This poten-
tial control, however, must be balanced not only against the possi-
bility that Congress may decide to apply the United States immi-
gration and naturalization laws, but also against other limitations
imposed by the Covenant itself, specifically the provisions applying
the Fourteenth Amendment to the commonwealth.80
Northern Mariana Islands: A Mass Grant of United States Citizenship, 8 U. CAL. D.
L. REv. 453, 459-68 (1975).
78. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 503(a):
The following laws of the United States, presently inapplicable to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, will not apply to the Northern Mariana Is-
lands except in the manner and to the extent made applicable to them by
the Congress by law after termination of the Trusteeship Agreement: except
as otherwise provided in Section 506, the immigration and naturalization
laws of the United States ....
See Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 55-57.
A draft statement of intention by the parties makes clear that until Congress acts
after termination of the Trusteeship, the TTPI immigration laws, as modified by the
Marianas, would continue to apply. The Report of the Drafting Committee appended
to the final version of the Marianas Covenant reaffirms this. Report of the Drafting
Committee §§ 503(a) & 506, reprinted in U.S. Office for Micronesian Status Negotia-
tions, Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Report on 2d Part of 5th and Final Ses-
sion of Status Negotiations, app. 6 (Feb. 4-15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Drafting
Committee Report].
79. Under the Code of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 53 TTC § 2
(1966), § 3 (1966), and § 53 (1973) respectively, this control may include the power
to naturalize citizens, to cancel naturalization, and to require travel documents be-
fore leaving, as well as the authority to control immigration through the use of entry
permits.
80. See Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 501(a). One of the privileges and
immunities of natural citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment is the right to
travel interstate. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 181, 183-85 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson JJ., concurring);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1868). The right to travel interstate has also been grounded upon the Privileges and
Im n3 unities Clause of art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wa.J.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). See also Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79
(1873). The Privileges and Immunities Clause now applies to the Marianas under §
501(a) of the Covenant. The freedom of Americans to travel outside the country has
been found, based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
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The MPSC suggested that the choice between United States
citizenship or national status be placed before the people in a ref-
erendum. On the basis of such a referendum, the language of the
Covenant would presumptively grant either citizenship or national
status, subject to an individual option for the other status."' The
United States Delegation agreed that an option should be avail-
able, but it wanted the choice of status to be between citizen and
resident alien, rather than citizen and national, 82 thus making the
The control of immigration would seem to be limited to non-U.S. citizens. The
Marianas' exclusive control is also limited by § 506 of the Covenant whereby the Im-
migration and Nationality Act will apply to the commonwealth to the following ex-
tent:
(1) With respect to children born abroad to United States citizens or non-
citizen nationals permanently residing in the Northern Marianas, the
provisions of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 and 1408, providing respectively for na-
tionality and citizenship at birth, and nationality without citizenship at
birth, will apply.
(2) With respect to aliens who are "immediate relatives" of United States
citizens who are permanently residing in the Northern Marianas, all the
provisions of the said Act will apply, commencing when a claim is made
to entitlement to "immediate relative" status.
(3) With respect to persons who will become citizens or nationals of the
United States under either Article III or § 506 of the Covenant, the loss
of nationality provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act will ap-
ply.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 506; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
62-67.
81. Marianas Political Status Commission Position Paper Regarding the Future
Political Status of the Mariana Islands (May 10, 1973), reprinted in MPSC Report,
supra note 22, at 16. Upon reflection over the difference between "citizen" and "na-
tional" it becomes apparent that each status has symbolic overtones. This is espe-
cially true concerning the irrevocability of the choice of one status over the other.
There is perhaps a greater possibility of being able to revoke "national" status. In
addition, it may be difficult to inherit citizenship from a national. Thus, if a child is
born abroad and both parents are U.S. citizens, the child is a U.S. citizen, as long as
one of the parents has resided within the United States at some time prior to the
birth of the child. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3) (1976). If only one of the parents is a U.S. cit-
izen while the other is a U.S. national, the parent who is a citizen must have resided
in the United States for at least one year prior to the birth of the child in order for
the child to be a citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(4) (1976).
82. The fact that there was a substantive legal and practical difference between
the status of a citizen and that of a national, contrary to the view of the U.S. Delega-
tion, was affirmed in the course of the House of Representatives debate on the ap-
proval of the Covenant. Representative Don H. Clausen of the Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs stated:
[Flollowing the implementation of the covenant, those born in the Marianas
will become American citizens. For those persons born in the Marianas prior
to becoming a commonwealth, American national status requires allegiance
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choice of citizen more likely.83 Consultations between the legal ad-
visors during the remainder of the second session led to a compro-
mise, as a result of which citizenship would be extended to the
people of the Marianas, and the United States would accept the in-
clusion of a national status option, provided that such an option
proved to be consistent with United States law and policy.8 4
The MPSC, however, was concerned that an increasingly large
number of aliens might come to the Marianas under United States
immigration laws. 85 Therefore, the MPSC argued that before ter-
to the United States in return for which the American national is provided
free access to the United States and is afforded protection under the U.S.
consular system when abroad. On the other hand, American nationals are
precluded from holding Federal public office and cannot participate in na-
tional elections.
121 Cong. Rec. 23670 (1975). For a decision upholding the citizenship by collective
naturalization of the newly elected governor of the state, and discussing at length the
history of collective naturalization provisions from 1776 through 1867, see Boyd v.
Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892).
83. The Delegation argued:
It has been our assumption that those rejecting citizenship will become resi-
dent aliens in the new commonwealth. The concept of "U.S. national" has
little practical significance other than in the context of the workings of the
U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. The acceptance of a citizen-national
option would prove to be a serious administrative inconvenience and would
confer upon those inhabitants of the Mariana Islands who accept it an infe-
rior and awkward status, especially if they should move into the rest of the
United States. We would therefore prefer to omit that option unless you can
demonstrate to us its significant practical utility.
U.S. Statement on Political Status for May 16 (1973) Working Session, reprinted in
MPSC Report, sunpra note 22, at 22.
84. See U.S. Summary of Status Issues, reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note
22, at 26-27. The Delegation's summary on this point concluded: "We have no objec-
tion in principle with this proposition but this is a technical matter which the U.S.
Delegation believes should be studied further by both parties in Washington." Id.
This choice followed the MPSC Position Paper which presented a novel approach to
the issue. MPSC, Position Paper on U.S. Citizenship and Nationality in the Com-
monwealth of the Mariana Islands (December 6, 1973). Past legislative precedents
offered inhabitants a choice between citizenship, collectively extended, and reten-
tion of their foreign nationality upon express declaration. Furthermore, the term in-
habitant, traditionally used in collective naturalization, has generally been inter-
preted to include anyone residing in the territory and has not been restricted to
domiciliaries. See Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303 (1872) (British subjects who resided
in Detroit became citizens under the Jay Treaty of 1794).
85. [The proposed immigration provision] deals with the post-termination pe-
riod and is designed to assure, first, that children born of Marianas citizens will be
entitled to United States citizenship even if they are born overseas. The subsection
also provides that the residency requirements for citizenship through naturalization
will be satisfied by residence in the Marianas-but only for "immediate relatives" of
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mination of the Trusteeship Agreement, the local Marianas govern-
ment should be vested with the same control over immigration as
had existed under the TTPI. The MPSC Position Paper of May 28,
1974 thus urged that the Marianas eventually have the power to is-
sue and to regulate "[e]ntry permits authorizing entry and contin-
uing presence in the [commonwealth] for periods of more than
one year for the purpose of conducting business or residing in the
[commonwealth]," 86 subject to further amendment by the com-
monwealth and subject to the power of Congress to extend the ap-
plication of United States immigration and naturalization laws to
the area. 87 The Position Paper further emphasized the desirability
of adjusting the application of United States immigration and natu-
ralization laws to provide that residence or physical presence in the
Marianas after termination of the TTPI would satisfy any require-
ment of those laws just as residence or physical presence in a state.
But this adjustment would apply only to the following groups of
people: children, spouses, parents, brothers and sisters of United
States citizens or nationals who are domiciled in the Marianas; per-
sons born outside of the United States of parents either or both of
whom are citizens or nationals of the United States domiciled in
the Marianas; and United States nationals. 88
The MPSC Draft provided that for purposes of satisfying any
residence or physical presence requirement of the immigration and
naturalization laws of the United States, time spent in the Marianas
would be counted only for either "immediate relatives" of persons
who are United States citizens or nationals domiciled in the com-
monwealth, or for persons who themselves are nationals of the
those persons who become United States citizens or nationals under this section.
Other immigrant aliens must satisfy this residency requirement elsewhere. This fea-
ture would discourage immigration of persons merely wishing to take advantage of
the availability of United States citizenship. MPSC Position Paper on U.S. Citizen-
ship and Nationality in the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands app. at 4 (Sept. 6,
1973).
86. See Paper of the Marianas Political Status Commission Regarding Immigra-
tion 1-2 (May 18, 1974).
87. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 503; see Covenant Analysis, supra note
18, at 55-58. This seemed consistent with the U.S. Draft which provided that, in gen-
eral, the laws of the United States would not become applicable until termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement.
88. This was essentially the same proposal put forth in connection with the
previous discussion of citizenship. It is somewhat similar, though less restrictive,
than the treatment of American Samoa. See A.S. CODE tit. 9, § 201(b).
1981]
44 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
United States.8 9 The United States Delegation considered this fea-
ture of the MPSC Draft unduly restrictive. It believed that such a
restriction would prevent the immediate families of permanent res-
ident aliens from entering the Marianas as nonquota immigrants.
The MPSC Draft also provided that both the courts of general
jurisdiction established under the constitution of the common-
wealth and the United States District Court for the Mariana Is-
lands would have jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of
the United States in accordance with applicable law.90 Although
the United States Draft had not expressly vested the federal dis-
trict court with jurisdiction over naturalization, such an express
provision was not necessary since naturalization is traditionally a
matter of federal concern. 9 '
The naturalization and immigration laws would not take effect
until after termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, and even
then, not automatically.9 2 Although there was no guarantee that
Congress would eventually decide not to treat the commonwealth
as it had treated other territories, the scheme devised provided for
a transitional period. In any event, the Northern Mariana Islands
would still have an opportunity to present its recommendations to
Congress concerning the manner and the extent to which these
laws should be applied, before Congress acted. Until such time,
the immigration laws of the TTPI, as modified by the future com-
monwealth government, would continue to apply.
H. Political Representation
The Marianas Covenant does not give the Northern Marianas
representation in Congress.9 3 On this point, the Covenant repre-
89. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 304(c).
90. Id. § 305.
91. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 103(e).
92.. Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 503.
93. The constitution or laws of the Northern Mariana Islands may provide
for the appointment or election of a Resident Representative to the United
States, whose term of office will be two years, unless otherwise determined
by local law, and who will be entitled to receive official recognition as such
Representative by all of the departments and agencies of the Government of
the United States upon presentation through the Department of State of a
certificate of selection from the Governor. The Represenative must be a citi-
zen and resident of the Northern Mariana Islands, at least twenty-five years
of age, and, after termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, a citizen of the
United States.
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sents a considerable concession by the MPSC, which had originally
proposed that the future commonwealth have a nonvoting delegate
in the United States House of Representatives. The MPSC wanted
this delegate to receive the same compensation, allowances and
benefits as a full member of the House, to be authorized to intro-
duce legislation, to be assigned to committees and have the right
to speak on the floor of the Congress, in committee, and to vote in
committee. 94 Such a status was similar to that accorded the dele-
gates from Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands. The MPSC
indicated that the long-term aspiration of the Marianas people was
"to have a voting representative in Congress who will have all the
rights and privileges of other members of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives."9 5
The United States Delegation was not supportive, stressing
that Congress would be unwilling to permit representation to this
small area.96 Trying to insure some political representation to the
Marianas in the United States Congress, the MPSC addressed
these objections. The MPSC Draft provided that the common-
wealth would be entitled to a nonvoting delegate in Congress when
the population of the commonwealth reached 50,000, or earlier if
Congress should so provide. 97 Until that time, with the approval
of the people of Guam, there would be a nonvoting delegate re-
presenting both the Marianas and Guam. 98 Until either of these
conditions was met, the commonwealth was to be represented by
a resident commissioner accorded official recognition before all
departments and agencies of the United States, but who would
be without privileges or status in Congress.99
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 901; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
122-23.
94. MPSC Position Paper Regarding the Future Political Status of the Mariana
Islands, reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22 at 14.
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. U.S. Statement on Political Status for May 16, 1973 Working Session, re-
printed in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 21. Congressional resistance which made
resolution of the political representation issue difficult, continued throughout the ne-
gotiations on this point. See U.S. Informal Summary of Status Issues, reprinted in
MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 25. The U.S. Delegation, which negotiated on behalf
of the executive branch assured the MPSC of their support on this issue but did not
mention political representation in their Draft.
97. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 1101.
98. See id. § 1102.
99. See id. § 1103. The MPSC proposals contained a number of subtleties con-
sistent with their desire to follow the Puerto Rico precedent rather than those of the
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Because of opposition anticipated in Congress, the United
States Delegation continued to take the position that the Marianas
should have a resident agent entitled to official recognition, but
that expenses consequently incurred should be paid by the com-
monwealth. Furthermore, there was a dispute concerning the title
of the representative, irrespective of his status.100 The compromise
reached was that the representative is referred to as "Resident
Representative," rather than "commissioner," "delegate," or
"agent."''1 1 He is entitled to official recognition by all United States
departments and agencies after presentation of a certificate of se-
lection from the commonwealth Governor, through the Secretary
of State. 102
II. ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
The negotiations concerning the financial arrangements to be
made between the future commonwealth and the United States
were some of the most protracted and contested of the status nego-
tiations. They were complicated by the connection between this is-
sue and that of eminent domain.
In the matters of tax, trade, and economic participation in fed-
eral grant-in-aid programs, both parties relied upon Guam as a
model. As a result, the Covenant provides that income tax laws in
force in the United States are applicable to the Marianas as a local
territorial income tax on the first day of January fbllowing the ef-
fective date set by the President, just as those laws are presently in
Pacific areas. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 891-894, 1712 (1976). Election of the delegate would
be determined by local, rather than federal law. Official recognition of the delegate's
status would be conferred upon presentation of a certificate of election from the
Chief Executive of the Commonwealth or from both the Chief Executive and the
Governor of Guam to the Department of State. Finally, the United States govern-
ment would pay the delegate's salary and a variety of the costs of office.
100. The U.S. version used the term "resident agent" rather than "resident
commissioner" because it was said congressional representatives had expressed op-
position to the term on the grounds that resident commissioner implied a higher sta-
tus than "delegate," the title used for the representatives of Guam and the Virgin Is-
lands.
101. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
102. This representative does not have privileges in Congress, but the official
Report of the Draft Committee indicates that § 901 of the Covenant, "is not intended
to preclude the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands from requesting the
Congress of the United States to confer non-voting delegate status on the Resident
Representative provided for in this Section." Drafting Committee Report, supra note
78, at C-4.
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force for Guam. 10 3 References to Guam in the Internal Revenue
Code would be deemed to also refer to the Marianas, except where
these provisions are incompatible with the intent of the Cove-
nant. 10 4 Unlike Guam, however, the commonwealth may impose,
by local legislation, additional taxes, e.g., provide for rebates of any
taxes received, upon income derived from sources within the com-
monwealth. '0 5
The Northern Mariana Islands are not included within the cus-
toms territory of the United States. 106 Imports from the Northern
Mariana Islands into the United States customs territory are sub-
ject to the same treatment as are imports from Guam. 10 7 But the
similarity with arrangements concerning Guam cease here, for the
Covenant provides that the United States government agrees to
seek to obtain favorable treatment from foreign countries for
Marianas exports and to encourage those countries to consider the
Marianas as a developing territory. 10 8 The government of the
Northern Mariana Islands is given the authority to impose such ex-
cise taxes within its territory as are consistent with United States
international obligations. 10 9 The United States also agrees to pay
into the Commonwealth Treasury, as it does in the case of Guam,
to the benefit of the people of the Marianas, the proceeds of all
customs duties and federal income taxes derived from the Northern
Mariana Islands; all taxes collected under United States internal
revenue laws on articles produced in the Northern Mariana Islands
and transported to the United States, its territories or possessions,
or consumed in the Northern Mariana Islands; any other taxes
levied by the Congress on the inhabitants of the Marianas; and all
103. See Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 601(a); Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 67.
104. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 601(c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 70.
105. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 602; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 71.
106. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 603(a).
107. Id. § 603(b). The United States may levy excise taxes on goods manufac-
tured, sold or used and services rendered in the Marianas in the same manner and to
the same extent as such taxes are applicable within Guam. Id. § 604(a); see Covenant
Analysis, supra note 18, at 76.
108. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 603(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 73.
109. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 604(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 77.
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quarantine, passport, immigration and naturalization fees collected
in the Northern Mariana Islands.1 0
Those United States laws in existence on the effective date of
section 502(a) of the Covenant which provide federal services and
financial assistance programs, as well as the federal banking laws,
will apply to the Northern Mariana Islands just as they apply to
Guam."' In addition, the Micronesian Claims Act, 1 2 which pro-
vided for a $500,000 TTPI war fund, to be matched by Japan, and
an additional post-war claims fund with a ceiling of $20,000,000,
was applicable to the commonwealth.
The Covenant also sets forth provisions concerning United
States financial assistance to the future commonwealth. 1 13 The
United States agrees to provide direct multi-year financial support
to the commonwealth government for local government operations,
capital improvement programs and economic development; the ini-
tial period of financial assistance will be seven years. 1 14 Funds so
provided but not obligated or expended by the commonwealth dur-
ing any fiscal year would remain available for obligation or expendi-
ture in subsequent fiscal years for the original purposes for which
the funds were appropriated. 1 5 Furthermore, approval of the Cov-
110. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 703(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 92-93.
111. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 502(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 48-55.
112. Micronesian Claims Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-39, 85 Stat. 92 (terminated
by its terms Aug. 3, 1976, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2018).
113. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, art. VII; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 85-95.
114. Approval of the Covenant constitutes "a commitment and pledge of the
full faith and credit of the United States for the payment, as well as an authorization
for the appropriation," of guaranteed annual levels of direct grant assistance for each
of the seven fiscal years, as follows:
(1) $8.25 million for government operations, $250,000 each year to be re-
served for a special education training fund connected with the change
in the political status;
(2) $4 million for capital improvement projects, $500,000 each year to be re-
served for Tinian and $500,000 each year to be reserved for Rota; and,
(3) $1.75 million for an economic development loan fund, $500,000 each
year to be reserved for small loans to farmers and fishermen and to agri-
cultural and marine cooperatives, of which $250,000 each year will be
reserved for a special program of low interest housing loans for low in-
come families.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 702; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
86-90.
115. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 704(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 93.
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enant will constitute an authorization for the appropriation of a pro-
rata share of the funds for the period between the effective date of
section 704 and the beginning of the next fiscal year. 116 These
amounts will be adjusted for inflation for each fiscal year on the ba-
sis of the percentage change in the composite price index issued by
United States Department of Commerce using the beginning of fis-
cal year 1975 as the base." x7 Upon expiration of the initial seven
year period, the annual level of payments in each category is to
continue until Congress appropriates a different amount or pro-
vides otherwise. 18
A. Direct Financial Assistance
The MPSC reasoned that there should be at least three sepa-
rate phases to the financial aspects of transition.119 The first phase,
probably extending one year, would be a planning period to facili-
tate changes required due to the new status. The second phase,
probably consisting of seven years, would be an implementation
period for those plans to establish the base for long-term growth
and deveopment for the Marianas. The third phase, possibly
twenty years or more in length, would be a development period
during which increasing responsibility for the support of the local
government would be assumed by the Marianas. It proposed that
Phase I funds, estimated at $4,500,000,120 be made available by
the United States, as a grant to the MPSC immediately upon con-
clusion of successful negotiations. In formulating their assessment
of Phase II budget support, the MPSC assumed that by 1981 the
per capita income in the Marianas would be somewhat less than
one-half of the United States per capita income, and that there
would be a tax burden in the Marianas equal to approximately fifty
percent of the tax burden borne by the people of the United
States.' 2 ' The MPSC proposed that, in the fifth year of Phase II,
116. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 704(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 94.
117. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 7 04 (c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 94.
118. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 704(d); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 94-95.
119. See Position Paper Regarding Economic Aspects of the Revised Political
Status of the Mariana Islands (May 14, 1973) reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note
22, at 33.
120. Id. at 34-35. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 1, at 159.
121. The result showed large commonwealth government deficits and therefore
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the two governments would explore budget support requirements
for Phase III, based on progression to that point.
The response of the United States was mixed; it stressed a
need for agreement on basic principles, resisting any immediate
discussion of the details of financial assistance arrangements. The
Delegation suggested that future financial arrangements with the
Marianas follow the traditional territorial approach which links fi-
nancial assistance to future needs. 122 In determining these needs
the United States Delegation noted that revenues from present lo-
cal sources, together with certain increased revenue attributable to
federal presence would represent a considerable source of income.
The Delegation particularly emphasized that the United States mil-
itary presence in the Marianas would be an indirect source of reve-
nue if current plans were implemented, and that the Marianas
would additionally benefit from payments made for land required
for military purposes. 123
The United States Delegation agreed with the long-range eco-
nomic objectives and the three-phase approach set forth in the
MPSC Position Paper. 124 The Delegation expressed grave doubts,
the MPSC proposed that the United States provide budget support during Phase II
as follows:
Year Support (millions of current $)
1975 19.2
1976 22.4
1977 23.9
1978 28.3
1979 27.5
1980 21.6
1981 19.9
D. MCHENRY, sulpra note 1, at 159.
122. U.S. Response on Economics and Finance, reprinted in MPSC Report, su-
pra note 22, at 48. The United States would assume certain limited obligations to
provide budgetary support and economic assistance to the Marianas. Additional fi-
nancial assistance, in the form of either direct financial grants to support government
operations or capital improvements, would depend largely upon mutually deter-
mined needs.
123. The Delegation emphasized the importance of the construction and the
operation of the base on Tinian, and underlined the basic interests of the two parties
to the negotiations. The United States' interests were military in nature while the
Marianas' were financial. It would take six years to construct the U.S. base and dur-
ing that time, $39.8 million dollars was expected to flow into the local economy. It
was estimated that the economic impact of the operation of the base would be $15
million per year.
124. See U.S. Commentary on MSC [sic] Paper on Economics and Finance,
(May 23, 1973), reprinted in MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 55.
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however, concerning the details of the development plan put forth
by the MPSC, particularly with regard to rates of growth, the use
of unusually high pay scales, and the low estimates of non-
assistance sources of revenue.' 2 5 The MPSC continued to defend
its estimates as reasonable and to express its own doubts about the
optimistic estimates of non-assistance revenue sources provided by
the United States Delegation. 126
Toward the close of the second session, the focus of the nego-
tiations shifted from a discussion of the relative merits of a deficit
support assistance program as opposed to a fixed annual assistance
program to the practical application of both. During these negotia-
tions, the United States agreed to a financial commitment "over an
initial period of years," while the two delegations agreed 127 to ap-
point a joint working committee on economics and finance to re-
view detailed plans and cost estimates.' 2 8
By the close of the third negotiating session, a tentative agree-
ment had been reached on the principles governing the economic
and financial provisions of the Covenant. 129 The United States also
agreed tentatively to provide both funds for transitional programs
and activities, and financial support over an initial period of years
at fixed levels.13 0 The United States Delegation proposed direct
federal assistance for the first five years of the new political status as
follows: $7.5 million annually to support government operations, $3
million annually for capital improvements; and, $1 million annually
for a Marianas development loan fund. Such support was to be re-
viewed before the end of that period to determine future levels of
support. Furthermore, it was estimated that $3 million would be
available annually in the form of federal financial assistance pro-
grams and services. The MPSC stated, however, that a level of di-
125. Id. at 62-63.
126. See Response to Comments of Ambassador Williams and Mr. J. Wilson on
the MPSC Economic and Financial Position Paper, reprinted in MPSC Report, supra
note 22, at 59.
127. Joint Press Release (May 29, 1973), reprinted in U.S. Office for Microne-
sian Status Negotiations, Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Report on 2d Sess.
of Status Negotiations 5 (May 15-June 4, 1973).
128. MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 64.
129. See notes 103-09 supra and accompanying text.
130. Final Joint Communique (Dec. 19, 1973), reprinted in U.S. Office for Mi-
cronesian Status Negotiations, Marianas Political Status Negotiations, Report on 3d
Sess. of Status Negotiations 9 (Dec. 6-19, 1973).
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rect assistance higher than the total of $14.5 million would be re-
quired during the first five years.1 31
The reason given in the MPSC Draft, for United States
support differed from that given in the United States Draft. It
provided that the United States would supply direct financial as-
sistance for government operations and programs, capital improve-
ment and economic development.132 Such support was to continue
until a standard of living had been achieved which was comparable
to that found in other parts of the United States and the common-
wealth government was able to meet its financial responsibilities
from its own resources.
The United States Draft provided for United States financial
support to "facilitate the achievement of economic self-sufficiency
and higher standards of living."' 3 3 The MPSC argued that the term
"facilitate" indicated only a short-term commitment. Furthermore,
the United States Draft referred to a "higher standard of living,"
whereas the MPSC argued that the appropriate reference point
was the standard of living found in other parts of the United
States. 134 Because the United States continued to oppose the
MPSC's reference point, Covenant does not include such an eco-
nomic objective.
The United States Draft also provided for direct financial as-
sistance for five years but it was silent about future aid for multi-
year periods. 135 The MPSC Draft, provided for direct financial as-
sistance at guaranteed levels for not less than seven years, and for
continued multi-year commitments. 136 These drafts both provided
131. Id. See also D. MCHENRY, supra note 1, at 160.
132. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 801.
133. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 601.
134. The United States ceased emphasizing per capita income and the progres-
sive development toward economic self-sufficiency when the MPSC argued that
"economic self-sufficiency" was not a legitimate goal and that the complete transi-
tion to a new political status could not be accomplished until the Marianas were a
self-sufficient unit with a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed in other parts
of the United States. The United States also ceased using the words "joint effort"
and instead focused on its obligation to the economic development of the common-
wealth without referring to contributions which the commonwealth would make. See
United States Presentation on Phase II Goals and Financial Assistance (Dec. 13,
1973); MPSC Response to the United States Presentation on Phase II Goals and Fi-
nancial Assistance, (Dec. 15, 1973).
135. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 602(a)(1).
136. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 802.
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the same basic categories of assistance. Despite this, the MPSC ar-
gued that the language of the United States Draft appeared to re-
quire that the economic development loan program funds be made
available to individuals as long-term, low-interest rate loans. This
requirement was not included in the MPSC Draft since it was be-
lieved that the commonwealth, in accordance with the principles of
self-government, should determine for itself the terms of the loans.
Nevertheless, the MPSC did admit that the most practical use of
the loan fund would be long-term, low interest loans. They also ad-
mitted that even if the Marianas had complete authority, the sug-
gested United States terms were likely to be implemented.
The MPSC had also argued in favor of inserting language
which would have made approval of the agreement by the United
States an appropriation, as well as an authorization, of funds for
multi-year direct financial assistance. Rejecting this position, the
United States Delegation argued that the status agreement should
not, and perhaps could not, serve as an appropriation of funds. To
give the Marianas the multi-year assurance it wanted, the Cove-
nant states that United States approval will constitute:
a commitment and pledge of the full faith and credit of the
United States for the payment, as well as an authorization for
the appropriation, of the indicated guaranteed annual levels of
direct grant assistance to the Government of the Northern
Mariana Islands for each of the seven fiscal years .... 137
137. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 702. See also Joint Draft, supra note 9,
§ 606(b):
During the initial seven year period of financial assistance provided for in
Section 702, and during such subsequent periods of financial assistance as
may be agreed, the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands will au-
thorize no public indebtedness (other than bonds or other obligations of the
Government payable solely from revenues derived from any public improve-
ment or undertaking) in excess of ten percentum of the aggregate assessed
valuation of the property within the Northern Mariana Islands.
The MPSC had argued that a limitation on public indebtedness is a restriction
inconsistent with the principle of self-government. As a result, the MPSC Draft con-
tained no provision limiting the public debt. In contrast, § 503(b) of the U.S. Draft
placed a ceiling on the public debt without specifying the length of the term for
which the ceiling would be imposed. The compromise recognized the United States'
interest in the finances of the Marianas for the period during which the United
States was to provide substantial sums of money, and yet allowed for the exercise of
self-government appropriate to the gradual attainment of the goal of economic self-
sufficiency.
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B. Taxation Provisions
The first six sections of Title VI of the 1974 Draft treated the
application of United States income, estate and gift taxes to the
commonwealth based upon tentative understandings expressed in
the Joint Communique of December 19, 1973. Persons residing in
the commonwealth and who became citizens or nationals pursuant
to Title 11113 or prior to termination of the Trusteeship Agreement
would be subject to federal income tax on United States source in-
come, but not on income earned in the commonwealth. Further-
more, they would not be subject to federal gift and estate taxation
except with regard to property situated in the United States out-
side the commonwealth. 139 As drafted, these sections would not
have exempted residents of the Marianas who were already citizens
and who were expected to receive some protection under section
931 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 140 These sections would
preserve the status quo, since United States citizens in the
Marianas were then subject to such taxes.
Under the MPSC Draft the commonwealth would have had
exclusive authority to enact, amend, or repeal its internal revenue
laws. 14 1 This position seemed similar to that taken in the United
States Draft, which provided that the commonwealth was to enact
a non-discriminatory, comprehensive internal revenue law which
would be progressive and reflect local economic conditions.1 42 The
MPSC Draft omitted the "non-discriminatory" and "comprehen-
sive" requirements since the imposition of those requirements
through the Covenant would infringe the Commonwealth's right to
self-government. The United States Delegation then receded from
its position and granted the Marianas exclusive tax authority but it
proposed that this authority extend for a period of only ten years
subject to the limitation that the commonwealth could enact no law
imposing any tax upon United States or TTPI property. 143
138. See notes 76-92 supra and accompanying text.
139. Final Joint Communique, supra note 130, at 7.
140. Section 931 provides that United States citizens doing business in the
Marianas are not subject to federal income tax on any foreign source income,
including income earned in the Marianas, if they derive 80 percent of their gross in-
come from Marianas sources and 50 percent from the active conduct of a trade or
business in the Marianas. I.R.C. § 931.
141. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 605.
142. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, § 601.
143. This provision was similar to section 503 of the U.S. Draft, except that it
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Sections 607 through 612 of the MPSC Draft dealt with cus-
toms and excise taxes applicable to the commonwealth. They es-
sentially reflected the tentative agreement reached on customs du-
ties and excise taxes in the Joint Communique which ultimately
became the Covenant provisions. 144
The parties continued to differ over economic and financial
provisions into the final drafting stages. In May 1974, the United
States Delegation informally abandoned its agreement to give the
Marianas exclusive control over internal taxation, instead proposing
that the IRC be made applicable as a local tax ten years after the
effective date of the status agreement. By the time of the drafting
of the Joint Draft, the Delegation had again changed its position,
primarily due to the opposition of Representative Phillip Burton,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Territorial Affairs to the
May 1974 proposal. 145 The Delegation advanced the position that
the IRC should apply to the Marianas as it does in Guam, a "mir-
ror image" system. 146
The representative of the MPSC to the Joint Drafting Com-
mittee then put forward a tentative proposal which was based
primarily on the Puerto Rican model. Pursuant to this proposal,
the IRC would be applicable as a territorial income tax, but the au-
thority to amend, alter, modify or repeal the tax would be reserved
to the Legislature of the Northern Mariana Islands. It was argued
that such a proposal would satisfy the United States desire to have
a fully functioning tax system based on the IRC in effect when the
commonwealth government was established. 147 Moreover, the pro-
posal would insure local self-government in the commonwealth by
permitting the local legislature to make such modifications of the
tax as appropriate; it provided for the IRC to apply as a federal tax.
The United States Delegation rejected this proposal, arguing that
the Marianas should be treated in the same manner as Guam. The
expressly provided that the commonwealth's taxing power would be the same as that
of a state.
144. See notes 106-10 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Memorandum for the Marianas Political Status Commission (Nov.
1974), Joint Drafting Committee Working Status Agreement at 25-26.
146. The U.S. Delegation felt the mirror image system had the following ad-
vantages: favorable results in Guam; greater uniformity among the territories; and
simplicity. Moreover, only a single tax return would be required.
147. Memorandum for the Marianas Political Status Commission (Nov. 1974) at
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MPSC's own advisor indicated that whatever merits there might be
to the proposal of the MPSC, if congressional resistance to that
proposal continued, acceptance of the "mirror-image" tax system
might be prudent. Thus the United States version was eventually
adopted. ' 48
III. LAND
The status negotiations concerned two basic land issues: the
timing and disengagement of Marianas land from the rest of the
Trust Territory, and the extent of United States military rights on
Marianas land. Under the Covenant, all real property interests of
the TTPI are transferred to the commonwealth government, and all
TfPI personal property interests are to be distributed equitably no
later than the date of the termination of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment. 149 At that time, the commonwealth government would as-
sure the United States of continued use, on comparable terms, of
the real property then actively used for civilian governmental pur-
poses. Furthermore, the Covenant provides that the Isely Field fa-
cilities that had been developed with federal aid, and all facilities
for aircraft, would continue to be available for use by United States
military and naval aircraft without charge, unless such use proved
to be substantial. 150 In that event, a share of the operating and
maintenance costs could be charged. 151
148. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 601(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 67.
149. Marianas Covenant, su pra note 8, § 801; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 95-96.
150. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 804; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 113-16.
151. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 804(b). Id. § 8 02 (a) provides for the
leasing of land by the United States "to carry out its defense responsibilities ....
See generally Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 96-100. The Covenant's provision
specifically sets out the land available for defense purposes: (1) on Tinian Island, ap-
proximately 17,799 acres and the waters immediately adjacent thereto; (2) on Saipan
Island, approximately 177 acres at Tanapag Harbor; and (3) on Farallon de Medinilla
Island, approximately 206 acres [encompassing the entire island] and the waters im-
mediately adjacent thereto. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 802(a).
The commonwealth government is to lease this property to the United States for
a term of fifty years, with an option for renewal for all or any part of such property
for an additional fifty years. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(a); see Covenant
Analysis, supra note 18, at 100. In return, the United States agrees to pay
$19,520,600 in full settlement of the lease, including the renewal option, based on
the following allocations: (1) for the property on Tinian, $17.5 million; (2) for the
property at Tanapag Harbor, $2 million; and (3) for Farallon de Medinilla, $20,600.
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A separate agreement, entitled "Technical Agreement Re-
garding Use of Land to Be Leased by the United States in the
Northern Mariana Islands" (Technical Agreement), was executed
simultaneously with the Covenant. 152 This agreement temporarily
deferred United States utilization of land and established the
principles which govern the relations between the United States
military and the Marianas civil authorities. 153 The United States
agreed to lease back, for the sum of one dollar per acre per year,
approximately 6,458 acres on Tinian and approximately 44 acres at
Tanapag Harbor on Saipan, to be used for purposes compatible
with future military use.' 5 4 The United States further agreed to
make available at no cost, 133 acres at Tanapag Harbor for public
use as a memorial park to honor the American and Marianas dead
of World War 11,155 and as much as possible to preserve land for
the local population.156 Furthermore, in the Technical Agreement,
the United States also "affirms" that it has no present need for, nor
present intention to acquire, any greater interest in property than
that of the long-term lease and option granted to it to carry out
"defense responsibilities" in addition to that granted under section
802(a) of the Covenant. 157
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
101-102. The agreed sum was to be adjusted for inflation by the percentage change
in the U.S. Department of Commerce composite price index, from the date of signing
the Covenant. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(b).
152. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 8 0 3 (c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 103-109.
153. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 8 0 3 (c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 105-109.
154. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(d); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 109-11.
155. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(e); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 112-13.
156. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(e); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 112-13.
157. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 802(b). If the United States should
need to acquire any additional interest in real property:
it will follow the policy of seeking to acquire only the minimum area neces-
sary to accomplish the public purpose for which the real property is re-
quired, of seeking only the minimum interest in real property necessary to
support such public purpose, acquiring title only if the public purpose can-
not be accompli'shed if a lesser interest is obtained, and of seeking first to
satisfy its requirement by acquiring an interest in public rather than private
real property.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 8 06(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
118-22.
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In addition, before exercising the power of eminent domain,
the United States must comply with the procedural requisites of
written notice and must attempt to first acquire any real property
by voluntary means.158 If it is not possible to obtain the interest by
voluntary means, the United States then "may exercise within the
commonwealth the power of eminent domain to the same extent
and in the same manner as it has and can exercise the power of
eminent domain in a State of the Union.' ' 1 59 Furthermore, this
power is to be exercised "only to the extent necessary" and in com-
pliance with United States laws. 160 Finally, the Covenant requires
the commonwealth government to restrict the alienation of land to
persons of Northern Mariana Islands descent during the first
twenty-five years of commonwealth.' 61 Thereafter the common-
wealth may continue regulation as it deems appropriate. 162
A. Extent of Acquisition
On May 29, 1973, the United States Delegation presented its
position on future land requirements to the MPSC. Minimum United
States military land requirements were: indefinite continued use of
Farallon de Medinilla, an uninhabitable island of 229 acres used
since 1970 for target practice under an agreement with the TTPI;
retention of 320 acres in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, for future con-
tingencies; joint use of Isley Field, Saipan; retention of 500 acres
south of Isley Field for possible future development of a mainte-
nance and logistics area; and all of Tinian, the northern two-thirds
for a joint services military base, the southern third for civilian
use. 163 The MPSC expressed resistance to such sweeping needs. In
response, the United States Delegation emphasized the obligations
involved in forming the political union, arguing that contribution to
158. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 806(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 119-20.
159. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 8 06(c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 120-21.
160. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 806(c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 120-21.
161. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 805(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 116-17.
162. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 805(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 117.
163. See Land Statement of Ambassador Williams (June 3, 1973) reprinted in
MPSC Report, supra note 22, at 67.
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the common defense is one of the most fundamental of these obli-
gations. 164
The MPSC preferred that the United States select one of the
more distant Northern Islands, rather than Farallon de Medinilla.
Furthermore, the MPSC wanted assurances that safety precau-
tions would be implemented by the United States if the parties
later agreed that Farallon de Medinilla could be used for target
practice. Tanapag Harbor was potentially significant for the future
economic development of Saipan. The MPSC indicated that it
might consider leasing some of the area to the United States, pro-
vided that it was used immediately for the development of facilities
within the civilian community, with possible military use depen-
dent upon future requirements. The MPSC had no objection to the
continued joint use of rights of Isley Field but it rejected the re-
quest for 500 acres south of, and adjacent to, the field because of its
importance for the future economic development of Saipan. The
MSPC opposed the lease of the entire island of Tinian to the mili-
tary, even if there were a provision for a lease-back of one-third
of the land for community related civilian use. It was prepared to
negotiate a lease only for that portion of the island actually re-
quired for military purposes. The MPSC also wanted civilian con-
trol over the portion of Tinian not included with the military
base. 1 6 5
164. Id. The MPSC believed that the U.S. requests for land on Saipan for mili-
tary purposes were unreasonable. It noted that these requests were made solely for
contingency purposes. They argued that the presentation of these requests at that
point in the negotiations reflected a lack of confidence in the future commonwealth's
willingness to honor its responsibilities within the political union if a contingency
arose.
165. In a Position Paper of May 24, 1974, the MPSC was more forthcoming: agree-
ing to allow the continued use of Farallon de Medinilla as a target area; agreeing to
make available almost all of the approximately 320 acres adjacent to Tanapag Harbor,
Saipan, with the remainder to be available on certain conditions, namely, U.S. per-
mission for maximum feasible joint use of all land and facilities developed for mili-
tary purposes and the creation of a joint U.S.-Marianas venture to develop the "A"
Dock for civilian use. Furthermore, the MPSC was willing to make available approx-
imately 500 acres at Isley Field if the U.S. would consider in good faith future rea-
sonable requests for lease-back. The MPSC would consider making available approx-
imately 17,500 acres on Tinian for the proposed joint service military base, provided
the U.S. reevaluate its acreage needs in good faith. Finally, the MPSC articulated the
link between any concessions in these areas and the level of Phase II financial as-
sistance: "[T]he Commission is not prepared to agree to any public announcement
(joint or unilateral) of its decision regarding land requirements until the United
States agrees to a satisfactory level of Phase II financial support for the Marianas."
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B. Form of Acquisition
Acknowledging the importance which the Marianas people at-
tach to land, the United States Delegation agreed to the princi-
ple that all public lands would be returned to the Marianas people
and offered to protect the land from attempts at control by outside
private interests. 166
By way of leavening this position, the Delegation suggested
that the United States might
be willing to commit itself, if at some time in the future a deci-
sion was made to close the Tinian base, to make the land avail-
able to the people of the Marianas through some kind of cove-
nant within the purchase arrangement. There is some precedent
for such a procedure. However, such a qualification would in
turn have a marked effect on the initial purchase price which the
U.S. was able to pay. 167
Pursuant to the provisions of the Use and Occupancy Agreements
for land used for military purposes within the TTPI, particularly
within the Marianas District, the United States need for land was to
be reviewed every five years by a representative of the T[PI and a
representative of the Navy Department. If such review did not re-
sult in agreement concerning the necessity of continued operation
of any Use and Occupancy Agreement, the matter was to be pre-
sented to the President for final decision. 168
Position Paper of Marianas Political Status Commission Regarding U.S. Military
Land Requirements in the Marianas 6 (May 24, 1974).
166. The Delegation stated its basic position on the method of acquisition:
The U.S. Government historically purchases, not leases, land when it
acquires land for the public good and for uses involving substantial invest-
ment over a long period of years. This is as true in the acquisition of land
for the building of dams, hospitals, schools, post offices, etc., as it is with
military bases. The U.S. Congress is reluctant to commit large sums to pro-
jects with only the protection of a lease. The proposals for land acquisition
which have been discussed here certainly fall in this category.
Land Statement of Ambassador Williams (June 3, 1973), reprinted in MPSC Report,
supra note 22, at 157.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Use and Occupancy Agreement for Land in the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, Saipan District, 2(B) which provides:
On or about June 30, 1961 and on a similar date each five year period there-
after, the agency of grantee, i.e., the United States having the use and occu-
pancy of said land or the Department of the Navy as the representative
thereof, and the grantor, i.e., The Government of the TTPI, Saipan District
shall jointly review and determine the need for continuing the use and occu-
pancy granted hereby.
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During this period of the negotiations, the United States Del-
egation claimed that under the Use and Occupancy Agreements, it
had obtained permanent use rights in the land, and was therefore
not required to pay the fair market value of any portion of military
retention land which it wished to use after termination of the
Trusteeship.' 69 The MPSC contended that such a construction of
the Agreements was inconsistent with their terms as well as those
of the Trusteeship Agreement itself. The United States claim was
eventually dropped. It was subsequently decided that all such
agreements would be terminated one hundred eighty days, at the
latest, after the approval of the Covenant and the local constitu-
tion. 170
The United States Delegation stressed that, although no im-
mediate development as planned, the requirements for areas like
that around Isley Field was "not hypothetical but contingent; that
is, it will be needed immediately if we were to move out of some
other location or if another location could handle a new require-
ment."'171 In the Tanapag Harbor area, where the United States
currently held 640 acres, the bulk of the current industrial devel-
opment was in the 320 acres the United States was prepared to
release. The Delegation indicated that the United States govern-
Sections (C) and (D) provide:
(C) Review by the President. In the event the review provided for in para-
graph (B) does not result in agreement as to the need for continuing
grantee's use and occupancy, the matter shall be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States for final decision.
(D) Termination of Use and Occupancy. In the event of a decision pursuant
to paragraphs (B) or (C) that a need for the continued use and occu-
pancy of said land does not exist, the estate granted hereby shall termi-
nate thirty days from the date of such decision, and revert to the
grantor. During said thirty day period the grantee may if it elects re-
move any structure or improvements it has heretofore erected or may
hereafter erect on the land and if the structures or improvements cannot
be removed during said thirty day period, the grantee shall be
permitted such additional reasonable time as may be required.
Under § 3, land which the grantee does not actively use is to be made available to
the grantor on a license basis for the use and benefit of the people. See also Memo-
randum for the Marianas Political Status Commission Concerning Military Retention
of Land in the Northern Mariana Islands 12-13 (Oct. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Memo on Military Retention of Land].
169. Memo on Military Retention of Land, supra note 168, at 1-3.
170. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, §§ 804(a), 1003(b); see Covenant Analy-
sis, suipra note 18, at 113-15, 132-33.
171. U.S. Comments on MPSC Responses on Land 2 (May 29, 1974).
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ment was willing to consider reducing the size of the area de-
scribed in its requirements in favor of local industrial development,
provided assurances could be given that such development was
harbor-oriented. Furthermore, the United States was prepared to
continue the practice of allowing harbor-oriented activities to be
placed on this land for private commercial purposes.
In the view of the United States Delegation, the only question
with regard to Tinian was whether the United States needed all
the 18,500 acres it was requesting for its operational base. The
Delegation argued that, while the requirements might appear
large, they were actually small compared to comparable facilities
elsewhere. The decision had been made to combine all operations
on Tinian in order to save land elsewhere in the Marianas. On the
question of the proposed development of San Jose Harbor, Tinian,
and the resultant displacement of civilian activities, the Delegation
indicated that joint use of the harbor was acceptable to the United
States and compatible with military requirements. Such use could
include construction of harbor-oriented facilities and normal com-
mercial operations in port, except when safety required otherwise.
It was estimated that ammunition handling, which would limit har-
bor activity, would occur infrequently in any given year. In practi-
cal terms, areas on the island could probably still be used for agri-
cultural and recreational purposes, including the present beach at
San Jose Harbor. Warehouses and the necessary equipment for
handling and processing civilian cargo could still be built. Histor-
ical sites would be left untouched, and the church would remain
undisturbed and could be used.
The MPSC was critical of article VII, section 702 of the
United States Draft. It considered this section to be vague on the
specific interests and extent of land necessary to the United States.
The MPSC stated emphatically that it would not agree to the sale
of land on Tinian for military purposes although it would agree to a
lease. 172 It recognized the United States' preference for outright
purchase, but noted that:
the prevailing practice in the United States has little relevance
to the Mariana Islands, where land is scarce and has a special
cultural significance to the people. Regardless of the guarantees
172. Response of Marianas Political Status Commission to the United States Po-
sition Paper on Land and Military Requirements, reprinted in Report of the
Marianas Political Status Commission at 112.
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which the United States might make, the members of the Com-
mission could not possibly justify or explain to their constituents
or families the seemingly permanent transfer of so much of the
Marianas limited land to the United States for military pur-
poses. 173
At this point, the United States position wavered. Although
the Delegation still refused to accept the notion of periodic pay-
ments and continued to insist on a lump-sum payment, it no longer
opposed a long-term lease arrangement. 174
The Joint Draft did not resolve either the question of whether
173. Id. at 113 (emphasis in original).
174. The Delegation suggested the following quid pro quo:
Neither the Executive Branch nor the Congress would be willing to con-
sider periodic adjustments. Indeed the U.S. would be willing to consider a
long term lease only if it were spread over 99 years or 50 years with an au-
tomatic 50 year renewal at U.S. option and a single lump sum payment cov-
ering both the initial period and the renewal option. Periodic adjustments
represent a thoroughly unsatisfactory way of doing business and can only
lead to untold future difficulties....
U.S. Comments on MPSC Responses on Land 2 (May 29, 1974) (emphasis added).
Section 902 of the MPSC Draft provided that the commonwealth government,
through a Public Land Corporation, would enter into leases with the United States
Government for the various areas on the following terms: 1) 50 year term with option
for 50 years; 2) reversion for failure of continuous use (5 years); 3) lease payments to
be determined by an Ad Hoc Board; reassessing every 5 years; 4) maximum use of
land and facilities by civilians; 5) joint community development; 6) relocation of dis-
placed persons; 7) environmental protection; 8) local military procurement whenever
possible; 9) joint grievance procedures; and, 10) adjudication of breaches.
The problem of the method of acquisition continued throughout the negotiations
until mid-December 1974. On May 27, 1974 the MPSC stated its unequivocal posi-
tion:
Even if the Members of the Commission were fully persuaded by the U.S.
presentation, we could not agree to sell this land to the United States. It is
our unanimous view that the status agreement we are now negotiating
would not be approved by the people if it involved a sale of land to the
United States. This is true, we believe, even though there could be a guar-
anty of reversion in the event the land is no longer needed for military pur-
poses. This is true, we believe, even though the practical difference be-
tween a sale and a 50-year lease (with an option to renew for another 50
years) may be difficult for the United States officials to appreciate. For our
people, however, this is a very important distinction which the Commission
must respect. If this is made clear to Members of Congress, we are confident
that they will agree to authorized [sic] the proposed military activity in the
Marianas even though the land is leased, for there seems to be no significant
advantage to a purchase insofar as the security interests of the United States
are concerned.
Marianas Political Status Commission, Position Paper of May 27, 1974 at 2 (emphasis
in original).
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the land would be leased or sold to the United States, 175 or what
the terms and conditions of any leases would be.176 The MPSC fa-
vored the inclusion of a detailed statement of the lease terms in
the Covenant, while the United States position, substantially that
adopted in the Covenant, referred to a "technical agreement"
which was to be signed by the parties. 177
The question of the method of acquisition was finally settled at
the fifth session of negotiations in December 1974. At the opening
of the session, Edward Pangelinan, the chairman of the MPSC, re-
affirmed the MPSC's opposition to the "permanent alienation" of
the Marianas' scarce resource. 178 The MPSC once again proposed,
and the United States accepted, a fifty year lease with a fifty year
option in addition to a lump-sum payment.179
C. Paynwnt
The issue of the appropriate criterion for compensation was
never resolved. The MPSC argued that no price for land on Tinian
could be considered fair and just unless the valuation was deter-
mined after an exploration of all relevant factors, including the fu-
ture growth potential of the Marianas and the relationship between
the relative amounts of developed and undeveloped land. The
MPSC suggested relating Marianas land values to those on Guam
or Hawaii. The United States Delegation considered this approach
unconventional, since it was standard United States practice to de-
termine fair market value in situ. It did not believe that valuation
would be difficult where an active market for private real estate ex-
isted and where current land rates in different localities were a
matter of record and easily accessible. Nevertheless, it admitted
that the large amount of public or military retention lands had no
easily ascertainable market value. Thus the United States proposed
negotiating a single lump sum figure for all land involved for its
175. See Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 802.
176. See id. § 803.
177. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 80 3 (c); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 104.
178. Statement of Edward DLG Pangelinan, Chairman of MPSC (Dec. 5, 1974),
reprinted in U.S. Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Marianas Political Sta-
tus Negotiations, Report on 5th Session of Status Negotiations, 9, 19 (Dec. 5-19,
1974).
179. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 803(a); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 100-01.
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present requirements. 1 80 It emphasized that such a figure would
not be arbitrary, but would be based upon an agreed average price
per acre of land in different locations. The MPSC countered by
emphasizing what it considered to be the central factor in deter-
mining fair market value, namely, "that price at which an owner
would sell land to a buyer fbr whatever use the buyer believes
would be most profitable."'' It argued that the United States had
ignored basic factors which determined land market conditions in
the Marianas. For example, past and present land uses and land
transactions had been determined by TTPI government policies
which restricted land development and artificially depressed land
prices. Standard land valuation indicators could not, therefore, be
relied upon. Furthermore, the MPSC resisted any suggestion that
distinctions be made between public and military retention land for
purposes of land valuation. The United States Delegation agreed
that agricultural land of equivalent quality in any location should
be accorded the same value whether it was located on public or
military retention land. 182 Nevertheless, it insisted on making a
distinction between the two types of land by discounting the value
of the military retention land to account for both pre-existing
United States payments and early relinquishment of use and occu-
pancy rights.
During the July 1974 meeting of the Joint Land Committee,
the United States Delegation agreed to accept either a negotiated
figure or an appraisal, as long as certain guidelines were included.
The Delegation's view was that if the MPSC proposal for complete
appraisal was followed, then a procedure comparable to that used
by the Navy for acquiring land should be followed.1 83
Despite the fact that the MPSC commissioned an appraisal by
a consultant, the final price was determined not by actual land
180. See U.S. Delegation, Talking Points for Presentation to MPSC on Land
Determination of Fair Market Values (May 24, 1974).
181. Position Paper of Marianas Political Status Commission in Response to
U.S. Presentation on Various Land Issues 4 (May 27, 1974).
182. U.S. Comments on MPSC Responses on Land 3 (May 29, 1974).
183. See Summary and Analysis of Initial Three Day Meeting of the Joint Land
Committee 3-4 (July 15-17, 1974). A board would be appointed consisting of three
other members and an appraiser, with the nomination of a chairman by the pertinent
U.S. Commander. The board would develop guidelines under which the contract
was to be performed, and identify the optimal use for the land in question based
upon current and not speculative use, no more than approximately three years into
the future.
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value but by negotiation. Thus, in December 1974, in an attempt
"to negotiate in the spirit of compromise and to expedite the
reaching of . . .agreement,"' 184 the MPSC retreated from its pro-
posed estimate of $34 million to a final figure of approximately $29
million. 185
The price to be paid for the lease was reached in the fifth ses-
sion. Unfortunately, a series of budgetary problems caused the De-
partment of Defense to decide to postpone indefinitely the con-
struction of a base on Tinian. This news leaked during the fifth
session. The MPSC had conceded considerable acreage on Tinian
with great misgivings and had been told that the military activity
there would have advantageous economic spinoffs. It responded in
a Position Paper on December 13, 1974, and its tone was not
pleasant.1'1 In that same Position Paper, the MPSC expressly
stated that it agreed to the concessions in reliance on United States
representations concerning the economic spinoffs. 187 The United
184. See Position of Land Values for Lands to be Acquired by the U.S. 5 (Dec.
16, 1974).
185. Id.
186. MPSC Position Paper on Land Issues 4 (Dec. 13, 1974):
It should be obvious to the U.S. Delegation that this recent announcement
places the members of the Commission in a difficult political position. Time
after time during the past eighteen months, we have joined with the U.S.
Delegation in public meetings on Tinian and elsewhere concerning your im-
mediate and pressing military requirements for two-thirds of Tinian. Time
after time, we have accommodated your changes in plans and tried to ex-
plain them to our people. Finally, last spring, after the most difficult deliber-
ation, the Commission tentatively agreed to make two-thirds of Tinian avail-
able to meet U.S. military requirements.
187. The MPSC stated:
As the history of these negotiations shows, the Commission was skeptical
from the very beginning regarding the economic benefits expected to flow to
the people of the Marianas from the planned base on Tinian. We continually
emphasized only the resources available to the future Government from
non-military sources. We framed our requests for Phase II support without
regard to income which might be anticipated through increased economic
activity resulting from Tinian base construction and operation or through re-
bates of Federal income taxes paid by U.S. military and civilian personnel
permanently stationed at the Tinian facility. The U.S. Delegation, however,
repeatedly criticized our economic analysis for ignoring these additional
sources of income. Finally, the Commission deferred to your persistent and
persuasive representations concerning the Tinian base and the income
which the Marianas Government would certainly derive from it. On this ba-
sis, we reached agreement on the level of Phase II support reflected in the
draft Covenant. In hindsight, we were mistaken in departing from our origi-
nal position in reliance on your well-meaning representations.
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States was embarrassed and quickly capitulated. The Joint Commu-
nique of that fifth session stated that, as a result of the decision not
to proceed with construction of the Tinian base and in view of re-
duced revenues and employment levels, the United States Delega-
tion had agreed to increase the levels of financial assistance for
each of the seven years of the initial financial agreement by
$500,000: $250,000 was to be provided for low-income home con-
struction loans, and $250,000 for retraining of workers, school cur-
riculum development, and training of civil servants.'188
D. Eminent Domain Authority
Considerable difficulties arose on the issue of the United
States power of eminent domain. The terms of the MPSC Draft
limited the United States to an interest no greater than a long-term
lease, subject to reversion upon failure of substantial and frequent
use of the land for the purpose for which it was originally acquired.
Furthermore, in order to restrict land transfer to persons of
Marianas descent, the United States could acquire interests in land
only from the commonwealth government or its agent and not from
private holders, except for interests of less than one year. In the
case of non-military purposes or interests in Tanapag Harbor and
Isley Field, approval from the Commonwealth Land Commission
or the Commonwealth Legislature was also required. The United
States also could not acquire any interest in land for military pur-
poses by means of a judicial order. However, in the event of war
or other military action by the United States, and upon a declara-
tion by the President that a particular tract of land was needed, the
United States Government would have the authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain. 189
In support of its position, the MPSC argued that its Draft pro-
vided a means for satisfying unanticipated land needs while as-
suring that scarce land resources would be conserved. The MPSC
further indicated that except for the limitations on military acquisi-
tions, the safeguards and limitations proposed were similar to those
contained in the United States Commonwealth Proposal.' 90 The
188. Final Joint Communique, supra note 130, at 40-44.
189. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 907.
190. MPSC Position Paper on Land Issues 10 (Dec. 16, 1974).
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military acquisition provision was considered necessary to guaran-
tee the terms of any military land agreements that might be set
forth in the Commonwealth Agreement. The United States Draft,
however, contained no such limitations on United States exercise
of eminent domain. 191 Rather, it stated that the United States gov-
ernment could acquire land for public purposes under terms and
conditions negotiated by the parties. 192 In the event that the
United States was unable to acquire property by negotiation, it
could as a last resort acquire property under its eminent domain
power with compensation for the "current fair market value of the
interest acquired, exclusive of any amount or amounts previously
paid, gratuitously or otherwise, therefore."' 9 3
The MPSC opposed these provisions in the United States
draft. It believed that if the United States had full power of emi-
nent domain, the provisions with respect to leasing of limited
amounts of land could be completely circumvented at any time.
The response of the United States Delegation was that the power
of eminent domain constituted a necessary attribute of sovereignty
and that no legislature could restrain itself, or its successors, from
exercising this power if public necessity demanded. It further
noted that not only did federal statutes provide adequate protec-
tion for private interests, but also, other procedural safeguards
could be considered. Moreover, preventing the United States gov-
ernment from exercising eminent domain to obtain title to land
would undercut its sovereignty in the commonwealth. The Delega-
tion added that Congress would not view favorably a procedure
prohibiting private parties from directly negotiating the sale of
their land to the United States government. Finally, the Delega-
tion argued, if the United States could not freely exercise eminent
domain to acquire necessary land for military purposes, then the
Marianas was not prepared to undertake its appropriate obligations
for the defense of the nation of which it was becoming a part.
The MPSC countered the arguments of the United States Del-
egation by reminding them that their proposal was based largely on
the limitations which had been proposed in the United States
Commonwealth Proposal and Draft Bill for an Unincorporated Ter-
191. U.S. Draft, supra note 9, art. VII.
192. id.
193. Id. § 703(b).
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ritory for Micronesia. 194 The MPSC then emphasized what they
considered to be a serious flaw in the Delegation's argument-the
fact that the Marianas did not have political representation. 195 The
MPSC was nevertheless encouraged by the suggestion that addi-
tional procedural safeguards against abuse of eminent domain may
be possible. With this in mind, the MPSC suggested that the
United States incorporate in the status agreement itself a formal
statement to the effect that foreseeable United States needs for
land for military purposes would be satisfied under the terms of
the agreement.
The basic position of the United States Delegation continued
to be that the power of eminent domain, as exercised in each state
and in all the territories, must be available in the Marianas. As a
compromise, the Delegation agreed to a provision requiring prior
written notice to the commonwealth government as a prerequisite
for taking land, whether it was acquired by voluntary or involun-
tary means. 196 It further agreed to make formal assurances: to ac-
quire only the minimum amount of land necessary; to acquire only
the minimum interest in land necessary; to acquire title only if a
lesser interest would not be sufficient; and to acquire public land
rather than private land whenever possible. The U.S. Delegation
also agreed to include a formal statement in the agreement itself
that the United States had no present intention or need to acquire
194. See Position Paper of Marianas Political Status Commission in Response to
U.S. Presentation on Various Land Issues 14-15 (May 27, 1974).
195. The U.S. may very well be asking the Marianas to undertake the same
obligations with respect to eminent domain as the States and Territories, but
without the same practical safeguards. One of the most important practical
safeguards against the unwarranted and unnecessary exercise of the eminent
domain power in the States, is the influence which the Senators and Con-
gressmen can bring to bear on the executive branch-by the introduction of
legislation, for example-to prevent a taking which a community opposes.
Those three territories which have non-voting delegates have a similar,
though not identical, recourse. The Commonwealth, however, may be in a
different position, for the precise status of our potential non-voting delegate
is not clear. We note that the draft covenant is wholly silent on this issue
notwithstanding the June 1973 Joint communique's statement that "The
United States delegation has agreed to support a request by the Marianas for
its own non-voting delegate in Congress."
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
196. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 806; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 118-20.
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any additional property or any greater interest in property than
that which is granted in the agreement. 197
E. Land Alienation Restrictions
Both the United States Delegation and the MPSC accepted
the contention that restrictions on alienation based on native heri-
tage were constitutionally justifiable. A dispute arose, however,
over United States insistence that the status agreement require the
commonwealth to impose such restrictions. 198 The strong federal
interest in these restrictions was the result of United States in-
volvement in the economic well being of the Marianas, whose eco-
nomic strength was below that of the rest of the country. The Del-
egation argued that the interests of the United States required it to
insure that the "original inhabitants retained their land holdings"
so as not to become "the landless pawns of outside investors.' '1 99
In its Position Paper of May 27, 1974, the MPSC questioned
the wisdom of making the imposition of land alienation restrictions
mandatory in the status agreement itself. In the view of the
MPSC, the issue was, in part, one involving the principle of self-
government. Restraints on land alienation, the MPSC maintained,
could not succeed unless the people involved understood and
agreed to them. The MPSC considered it advisable to leave the
option of land alienation restrictions to the people, as was done in
the 1974 Draft. Furthermore, the MPSC was uncertain both as to
how the United States intended to enforce the obligation to be
imposed and whether the provision would be subject to mutual
consent. Finally, the MPSC did not entirely accept the delegation's
197. Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 806.
198. The U.S. Delegation stressed that:
The need to protect the land holdings of the original population of an area
thus is sufficiently strong to override the generally applicable constitutional
requirements of equal protection and due process. This is indicative of the
extraordinary importance of this need. This circumstance also indicates that
this is not a matter solely of local interest, the enactment of which is within
the discretion of the Northern Marianas. There is also a strong federal inter-
est in legislation which will prevent the same thing that happened in
Hawaii from taking place in the Northern Marianas. Our draft covenant
therefore provides that the Northern Marianas will-not may-enact legisla-
tion to that effect.
U.S. Delegation, Talking Points on Land Alienation 3 (May 25, 1974) (emphasis in
original).
199. Id.
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assertion that there was a "strong federal interest" in restraints on
land alienation. 200
The Joint Draft, dealing with land alienation, reflected two
disagreements: the first was whether the Marianas should be em-
powered or required to regulate the alienation of real property;
and the second was whether the status agreement should require
the Marianas to "regulate the extent to which land now classified as
public land can be held by individuals." 2 0' Congress feared that if
no such restrictions were imposed, the Marianas people might sell
off their land and then turn to the federal government for contin-
ued financial assistance.
Although the MPSC did not dispute the appropriateness of
land alienation restrictions, it considered the issue to be the con-
sistency of requiring, in the status agreement, that such restrictions
be imposed indefinitely with the principle of local self-government.
The MPSC took the position that the decision to impose alienation
restrictions should be made by the local government. The compro-
mise reached provided for alienation restrictions for a certain num-
ber of years, after which time the people will be free to make their
own decisions on the matter.202
200. Still, the Delegation remained firm:
The United States has at present no particular ideas about the method of
enforcing this obligation. We had assumed that the Commonwealth would
faithfully carry out the commitments undertaken by it in the Status Agree-
ment. We did not anticipate the need to pass federal legislation in this field.
On the other hand, failure to carry out that obligation may be deemed to
constitute a refusal of the Commonwealth to contribute its fair share to its
own development and may be taken into consideration in determining the
amount of U.S. assistance after the expiration of the first seven-year period.
This would be particularly true if as the result of the failure to enact or to
enforce such limitation on land alienation a large portion of the population
of the Northern Marianas had lost its land, and the average citizen of the
Commonwealth consequently failed to benefit from the U.S. assistance
while those aliens who acquired the land absorbed the benefits of U.S. as-
sistance.
We are somewhat puzzled by the suggestion that our proposal involved
an issue of self-government and that any provision of the status agreement
which is not popular risks being evaded or sabotaged. The status agreement
will necessarily contain some unpopular undertakings by the Common-
wealth. But we assume their endorsement by the people in a plebiscite
would constitute their affirmative vote in favor of such restrictive legislation.
Comments on MPSC Responses on Land 10-11 (May 29, 1974).
201. Joint Draft, supra note 9, § 805.
202. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 805(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 116-17.
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IV. TRANSITION TO COMMONWEALTH
The Covenant detailed the process by which the Marianas
would approve it. First, the Covenant would be submitted to the
Mariana Islands District Legislature, and then to the people of the
Northern Mariana Islands for approval. Popular approval of the
Covenant required a majority vote of at least fifty-five percent in a
plebiscite administered by the United States as administering au-
thority under the Trusteeship. 20 3 United States agreement to the
Covenant was to be secured "in accordance with its constitutional
processes," 20 4 such approval was given through a joint resolution of
Congress approved by the president.
Upon approval of the Covenant, the President would issue a
proclamation announcing the termination date for the Trusteeship
Agreement and the establishment of the commonwealth. 20 5 Such a
determination by the President was to be final, and not subject to
review by any authority of the TIPI, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, or of the United States. 20 6 The parties envisioned the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Covenant in three stages: i.e.,
upon approval of the Covenant,2 0 7 upon a date within six months
203. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1001(a); See Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 127-28.
204. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1001(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 128-29.
205. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1002; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 130.
206. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1002; see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 130. It is questionable whether such an agreement is enforceable,
precluding a judicial determination in case of unreasonable government action.
207. Upon approval of the Covenant those sections which establish federal gov-
ernment authority and the skeleton of Northern Marianas government authority, and
which separate the Northern Marianas from the rest of the Trust Territory come into
effect: (1) the "mutual consent" limitation upon federal legislative authority in the
Marianas in matters affecting fundamental provisions of the Covenant (§ 105); (2) the
authorization for formulation and approval of the Constitution for the Northern
Mariana Islands (§§ 201-203); (3) the inapplicability of United States laws presently
inapplicable to the TTPI, unless Congress specifically acts to the contrary (§ 503); (4)
the Commission on Federal Laws to study and make recommendations on the appli-
cability of federal laws to the Marianas (§ 504); (5) the establishment of a Marianas
Social Security fund separate from the Trust Territory fund (§ 606); (6) the transfer of
title of TTPI property within the Marianas to the government of the Northern
Marianas (§ 801); (7) the determination of cases and controversies arising under the
Covenant by the United States courts (§ 903); (8) and the provisions for approval of
the Covenant, effective dates and definition of terms (Art. X).
MARIANAS COVENANT
of the approval of the Covenant and new local constitution,2 0 8 and
upon the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.20 '
A major focus of the negotiations concerned the timing of the
establishment of the commonwealth. The MPSC Draft provided
that the Mariana Islands District of the TTPI would become a self-
governing commonwealth upon the effective date of the agreement
but that implementation of the commonwealth status would not
take place until the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated. 210 The
208. Provisions necessary for the exercise of self-government consistent with
the probable continuation of separate administration of the Trusteeship are imple-
mented at this time: (1) the guarantee that the U.S./Commonwealth political relation-
ship will be governed by the Covenant, and that the right of local self-government
will be upheld (§§ 102 and 103); (2) the oath to support the Covenant, U.S. Constitu-
tion, applicable treaties and laws, and Marianas Constitution to be taken by Com-
monwealth officers and employees (§ 204); (3) the guarantee of privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the several States to the Marianas citizens (§ 304); (4) the
establishment of Marianas judicial authority (Art. IV); (5) the applicability of the U.S.
Constitution and federal laws, and the continuance of TTPI and Marianas District
and local laws presently applicable in the Marianas (§§ 501, 502, and 505); (6)
authorizing with limitations similar to other territories local financing and taxation
(§§ 601-605, 607); (7) provision of U.S. financial assistance (Art. VII); (8) the leasing
of land by the U.S. on Tinian, Saipan, and Farallon de Medinilla (9§ 802-805); and
(9) the limited powers of the Marianas Resident Representative and the requirement
of consultation between the federal government and the Commonwealth (§§
901-902). Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1003(b); see Covenant Analysis, supra
note 18, at 132-33.
This date is also the effective date of the Marianas Constitution. Section 1004(b)
of the Covenant contains the proviso that if the President finds that the effectiveness
of any provision of the Marianas Constitution prior to termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement would be inconsistent with it, the provision could be declared ineffective
until termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. No such declaration was made.
Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, § 1002; see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at
130.
209. Provisions reaffirming the United States' power over foreign affairs and
defense and the establishment of the Commonwealth are activated: (1) establishment
of the Commonwealth (§ 101); (2) U.S. authority over foreign affairs and defense
including power to acquire land in future (§§ 104 & 904); and (3) U.S. citizenship
and nationality of the Marianas people (§§ 301-303). Furthermore, those sections of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, that would relate to §§ 301-303 of the Cove-
nant, would be applicable to the Marianas. Marianas Covenant, supra note 8, 9 506;
see Covenant Analysis, supra note 18, at 62.
210. MPSC Draft, supra note 9, § 202: "The Marianas Islands District shall be-
come a self-governing commonwealth, to be known as 'The Commonwealth of the
Mariana Islands.' " See also id. § 1203, which provided that "within 30 days of the
Presidential certification that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Mariana
Islands, as approved by the people, is consistent with the Commonwealth Agree-
ment, the President of the United States shall issue a proclamation announcing that
the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands shall be established 180 days after the
date of the proclamation."
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MPSC was obviously concerned that parallel negotiations taking
place with the other districts in the Trust Territory might delay the
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. In light of this concern,
the MPSC maintained that the Trusteeship Agreement was not a
bar to the establishment of self-government for the Marianas and
that implementation of self-government would be entirely consis-
tent with the duties of the United States under the Trusteeship
Agreement. Nevertheless, the MPSC Draft provided that the polit-
ical union would not be affected, and United States sovereignty
would not be extended, 21' until termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement because the exercise of sovereignty by the adminis-
tering authority would not be consistent with its obligations under
the applicable trusteeship agreement.
After the required two thirds vote of the MPSC2 1 2 on Febru-
ary 20, 1975, the Marianas District Legislature approved the Cove-
nant unanimously 21 3 and eight days later formally requested the
United States government to set a date for a plebiscite on the Cov-
enant. The approval of the Covenant by the Commission was
achieved as a result of certain last minute changes in the Reserved
Draft. 2 14
Secretary of the Interior H. Rogers Morton issued Order No.
2973 on April 11, 1975, setting June 17, 1975 as the date for the
plebiscite.21 5 On June 22, 1975, the plebiscite commissioner re-
211. Id. § 203 stated: "Upon termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, the
Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands shall achieve political union with the United
States and the United States shall have sovereignty in the Commonwealth in accor-
dance with the terms of the Commonwealth Agreement."
212. 13 ayes, one abstention and one nay.
213. Res. 76-1975, Fourth Mariana Islands District Legislature, 5th Sess. (Feb.
20, 1975), reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Territorial and Insular Af-
fairs of the House Comm. oo Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
609-10 (1975).
214. E.g., the Marianas must be specifically named if territorial clause powers
were used, the Constitution would be deemed approved if there has been no action
six months after submission to the President, and U.S. assistance under the Covenant
would be used as local revenue matching funds. Res. No. 126-1975, Fourth Mariana
Islands District Legislature, 5th Sess. (Feb. 28, 1975).
A further change, at the insistence of the chartered municipalities of Rota and
Tinian, provided for equal representation in one house of the Marianas bicameral
legislature from the three leading Mariana Islands. See Hearing Before the
Subcoimno. on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Con in. oil Interior and
Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1975) (statement of Ambassador Haydn
Williams) [hereinafter cited as Williams Statement].
215. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Territorial and Insular Affairs of
[Vol. 4:19
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ported officially to the Secretary of the Interior that of the 5,005
qualified and registered voters, 95% of the total, who cast ballots,
3,945, 78.8%, voted in favor of the Covenant and 1,060 voted
against. 216
On July 1, 1975, President Ford transmitted the Covenant to
Congress. 217 The Presidential message transmitting the Covenant
has suggested approval in the form of a Joint Resolution, con-
taining only introductory language followed by the text of the Cov-
enant. 218 The major concern during the hearings in the House of
Representatives were the apportionment of the local legislature,2 19
war claims, 220 immigration restrictions, political representation and
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-10
(1975). The secretarial order set forth the procedure for the plebiscite and provided
for a plebiscite commissioner to supervise the plebiscite, a political education pro-
gram and permitted visitation by United Nations observers. Id. See also Marianas
Plebiscite, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1975, at 25, col 5.
216. Plebiscite Report, supra note 7, at 34. See also Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House Committee on Territorial
and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 410 (1975). For a more detailed account of
the policies and methods used in encouraging voters, see letter from Erwin D.
Canham to the President (June 19, 1975), reprinted in S. REP. No. 433, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 413-14 (1975).
217. See H.R. Doc. No. 207, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in S. REP.
No. 433, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1975).
218. Id.
219. The provisions of the Covenant, see note 49 supra and accompanying text,
which stated that each of the chartered municipalities, i.e., Saipan, Rota and Tinian,
would have equal representation in one house of the bicameral legislature received
considerable attention in the hearing on April 14, 1975. See Williams Statement, su-
pra note 213, at 93-94. Significantly, Representative Benitez, the Resident Commis-
sioner of Puerto Rico, saw that the peculiar geography of the Northern Marianas
justified this proposed arrangement. Id. at 124.
220. The House of Representatives changed the Administration's version of the
Joint Resolution to provide for full payment of war claims. Id. at 125. Mr. Emmett
Rice, Acting Director of the Office of Territorial Affairs indicated that the War
Claims Commission was then paying sixteen cents on the dollar for each claim, and
that, in all likelihood, less than forty percent of the value of the claims would ulti-
mately be paid. It was estimated that total World War II claims would amount to
$33,000,000. The fund for payment was somewhat in excess of $10,000,000 due to
changed exchange rates, but the fund appeared to be $22,000,000 short of full pay-
ment. Initial payments under the Micronesian Claims Act had been up to $1,000 on
any death claims and 16% of remaining claims. The Commission also estimated that
total post-war awards would approximate $30,000,000. The Micronesian Claims Act
authorized an appropriation of $20,000,000 for payment of these claims, so that full
payment would require a further authorization of approximately $10,000,000. FOR-
EIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS FOR 1975, at 76-78 (1975). Moreover, total awards issued would
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land issues.221 After a single day of hearings, and a favorable report
by the House Interior and Insular Afflars Committee,222 H.J. Res.
549 passed by a voice vote on July 21, 1975.223 The Senate's con-
sideration of H.J. Res. 549, and the Senate version, S.J. Res. 107,
which did not include the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the
House resolution was considerably longer than that of the
House. 224
The Senate Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs ordered
without dissent H.J. Res. 549, amended to conform to the Senate
version, reported on October 3, 1975.225 Subsequently, H.J. Res.
be a bare minimum approximation of wartime losses since the Commission used
values from the 1942-45 period in assessing losses and added no interest in
computing its awards. Such treatment compares unfavorably with the treatment af-
forded Guam, where the Commission paid 100% of the losses within five years of
the end of the Second World War. Id.
221. Herman Guerrero, Congressman from the Marianas District to the Con-
gress of Micronesia, expressed some concern on the effectiveness of the control of
immigration into the Marianas under the covenant. Williams statement, supra note
213, at 130. The House hearings also affirmed the U.S. Delegation's earlier resis-
tance to MPSC proposals for representation in the Congress. Id. at 110-11. The Con-
gress also voiced its preference for mandatory land alienation restrictions. Id.
222. H.R. REP. No. 364, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
223. 121 CONG. REC. 23662, 23677 (1975).
224. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]. Sen. Johnston ques-
tioned the impact of the "mutual consent" provision on the traditional territorial
powers of the Congress. Id. at 213. In response, Ambassador Williams noted that nei-
ther § 103 nor § 105 were designed to prevent Congress from legislating on matters
of local government. Id. The Senate questioned even more fundamentally the desira-
bility of the new acquisition regardless of the nature of the agreement. Sen. Hart
supported by Donald McHenry, questioned whether there were significant political
and economic advantages in establishing military facilities in the Marianas over
foreign-based facilities. Id. at 336-340. The Administration responded by citing the
strategic proximity of the Marianas to shipping lanes used for Mideast crude oil ship-
ments to Japan. Sen. Pell of the Foreign Relations Committee expressed strong op-
position to the Covenant on the basis of the mandate under the Trusteeship to lead
the people of the TTPI to self-government, i.e., independence. Id. at 235.
On the other hand, Mr. Edward Pangelinan, chairman of the MPSC, stressed the
importance of the provisions of the House version concerning the Micronesian
Claims Act and the extension of federal programs. Id. at 273-274. These sections had
not been included in the Senate version, and the exchange between Mr. Pangelinan
and Sen. Johnston indicated with clarity the contending positions. Id.
225. S. REP. No. 433, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975). Significantly, on the
question of the character of the relationship to be created by the Covenant, the
Committee's Report stated:
Although described as a commonwealth, the relationship is territorial in na-
ture with full sovereignty vested in the United States, and plenary legisla-
MARIANAS COVENANT
549 was referred jointly to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees. 226 At the end of the debate in the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Jacob Javits asked that a sense of
tive authority vested in the United States Congress. The authority of the lat-
ter is limited in a few areas through US federal restraint, i.e., by approval of
the Covenant, the US government will agree not to exercise its authority in
certain areas. The essential difference between the covenant and the usual
territorial relationship (e.g. that with Guam) is the provision in the Covenant
that the Marianas constitution and governmental structure will be a product
of a Marianas constitutional convention, which follows the pattern of Puerto
Rico, and not an organic act of the US Congress. Of particular significance,
the Marianas commonwealth relationship, unlike the governmental structure
of Guam or the Virgin Islands cannot be amended or terminated unilaterally
by the US Congress. The Marianas commonwealth relationship will be sig-
nificantly closer to the Guam territorial relationship than to the Puerto Rican
commonwealth arrangement. The Marianas constitution must be consistent
with applicable provisions of the US Constitution, and with US treaties and
laws applicable to the Marianas.
Id. at 15 (Footnote omitted).
226. The Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on November 5. See, S.
REP. No. 596, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). Administration spokesmen emphasized
that approval would fulfill United States international obligations under the Trustee-
ship; and that it would strengthen United States national security in the Western Pa-
cific. Id. at 8. A delegation, led by Bethwell Henry, Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives of the Congress of Micronesia, did not oppose, in principle, the desire of
the Marianas to separate from Micronesia. Id. at 9. It argued, however, that separa-
tion should preserve the ability of the other districts to exercise their right of self-
determination. Id. Furthermore, in its view, the resolution left unsettled several ma-
jor problems implicit in the separation of the Mariana Islands from the Trust
Territory, such as the status of the present TTPI capital, Marianas taxing and
regulatory authority over the personnel or property of the TTPI government until the
relocation of the capital, and the financial provisions of the two separate govern-
ments and their competing spheres of governmental authority and administration. Id.
There was also a discussion analyzing the costs and benefits of the Covenant in
which Sen. Hart categorized the Covenant as "an open-ended seven-year authoriza-
tion bill which [did] not even allow for congressional oversight or for the return of
unspent monies to the Treasury." Id.
The Foreign Relations Committee was concerned with the separation of the
Marianas from the rest of the Trust Territory. On November 20, 1975, the Commitee
considered two amendments introduced by Senators Pell and Percy. The Pell
Amendment was intended to declare the sense of the Congress that the obligation of
the United States to promote the development of the peoples of the TTPI towards
self-government or independence could best be accomplished by the submission of
an agreement or agreements resolving the political status of all of the TTPI to the
Congress, for its consideration. Id. at 11. The Percy Amendment would have ap-
proved the Covenant, but postponed implementation until agreements covering the
entire TTPI were presented for congressional consideration. Id. See also Group in
Senate Opposes Ford on Commonwealth in Marianas, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1975, at
10, col. 4.
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Congress resolution be added to the end of the H.J. Res. 549.227
On January 20, 1976, the Committee by a seven to four vote, rec-
ommended that the Senate adopt H.J. Res. 549 as amended.228
The General Legislation Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee held open hearings on November 17, 1975, to deliber-
ate on H.J. Res. 549.229 On January 20, 1976, the Subcommittee
voted by five to two with one abstention, to report favorably an
amendment proposed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., disapproving
the Covenant.2 30 On January 27, 1976, the full committee met in
open session and, by a margin of nine to six, voted to report H.J.
Res. 549 favorably without further amendment.23 ' When the reso-
lution reached the House of Representatives, Representative
Phillip Burton then requested unanimous consent2 32 for concur-
rence with the Senate amendment. 233 There was no objection to
Mr. Burton's request. 234 And on March 24, 1976, President Gerald
227. It is the sense of the Congress that pursuant to section 902 of the fore-
going Covenant, and in any case within 10 years from the date of the enact-
ment of this resolution, the President of the United States should request on
behalf of the United States the designation of special representatives to
meet and to consider in good faith such issues affecting the relationship be-
tween the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States as may be desig-
nated by either Government and to make a report and recommendations
with respect thereto.
S. REP. No. 596, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 177.
230. The substituted amendment read: That the Congress hereby recog-
nizes and sympathizes with the desires of the people of the Northern
Mariana Islands to have and exercise the right of self-determination. The
Congress also recognizes its obligation to promote the development of the
peoples of the entire Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands toward self-
government or independence and believes that such obligation can best be
accomplished by a consideration of a plan or agreement resolving the politi-
cal status of all of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands rather than by
consideration of plans for agreements for one or more islands or groups of is-
lands on a separate and individual basis.
Id. at 15. This was similar to the amendment proposed by Senator Pell. See note 226
supra.
231. Id.
232. 122 CONG. REC. 6105, 6147 (1976). The Congressman explained: "the Sen-
ate felt that the two add-on sections in this period of budgetary constraint were not
well advised. Although I personally disagree with that position, I am reluctantly ac-
cepting it and therefore, am urging my colleagues to yield to the Senate in those two
respects." Id. at 6147.
233. See note 230 supra and accompanying text.
234. 122 CONG. REC. 6105, 6149 (1976).
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Ford signed H.J. Res. 549 Approving a Covenant Establishing
Commonwealth Status for the Islands. 235
CONCLUSION
The Marianas Covenant negotiations are significant because of
their approach to the problems of the Northern Marianas as well as
their result. The basic bargaining positions were clear, as were the
disparate power positions.
The United States conducted the negotiations in an adversary
manner rather than in one required by the Trust relationship. 236
This approach was unfortunate and it accounted, in part, for the
difficulty in resolving the negotiations with the remaining districts
of the Trust Territory. 237
The result of the negotiations, though, was even more im-
portant. The Covenant clearly articulates the need for Northern
Marianas approval prior to federal action. This was the first time in
the history of United States territorial affairs that the federal gov-
ernment agreed to an unambiguous limitation on its power. The
open question at this point, is whether this will affect the rest of
the Trust Territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for that
matter.
235. 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. No. 13,482 (1976).
236. See generally Comment, International Law and Dependent Territories:
The Case of Micronesia, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 58 (1976). "Once an area has been recog-
nized as a dependent territory, it is accorded a special place in the international
community. The relationship between the administering nation and the dependent
territory is recognized as a fiduciary one, and the interests of the inhabitants of the
territory become paramount." Id. at 60.
237. On Oct. 31, 1980 the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia initialed accords with the United States concerning their political status.
On Nov. 19, 1980 the Palau Islands signed a similar agreement which will make
them independent except in military affairs, which will remain under the control of
the United States. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1980, at A10, col. 1.
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